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“WHO COUNTS?” “SEZ WHO?”* 
SANFORD LEVINSON** 
INTRODUCTION: WHY THE TITLE? 
When Professor Joel Goldstein called to offer me the opportunity to deliver 
the 2013 Childress Lecture, I was, of course, immensely flattered, albeit 
immediately intimidated when he added that it would include the participation 
as well of a daunting group of commentators. That did not, of course, prevent 
me from accepting, though it did lead to writing a paper that was far too long 
to be delivered as a single lecture. 
For better or worse, I quickly decided upon the title, “Who Counts?”, 
though I have subsequently modified it, for reasons that should become clear 
later in this Essay, by including the great American question, “Sez Who?” One 
reason for the initial title is that both Professor Paul Finkelman and I were 
participating at the time in a New York Times online debate1 on what The 
Times accurately labeled “The Constitution’s Immoral Compromise” of 
counting each slave only as the equivalent of three-fifths of a free person in 
computing the population that would serve as the basis for determining the 
number of members each state would get in the House of Representatives (and, 
 
* Prepared for delivery (in a truncated form) as the 2013 Childress Lecture at Saint Louis 
University School of Law on November 1, 2013. I am immensely grateful not only to Joel 
Goldstein and his colleagues for the invitation to deliver this Lecture, but also for the invitations 
(and acceptances) of a remarkable array of people who, not surprisingly, offered their own 
challenging and perceptive comments during the panels afterward. I am also grateful to Gregory 
Deschler and his colleagues on the Saint Louis University Law Journal for their hospitality and 
attentiveness to every need. In addition to my gratitude to Professor Goldstein for issuing the 
initial invitation, I have also benefited greatly from his detailed comments on an earlier draft of 
this Essay. And, as is a constant with anything I write and publish, I am also grateful to Mark 
Graber and Jack Balkin for their advice. I appreciate as well helpful feedback from Bob Mnookin. 
My discussion of the contemporary controversies over identifying members of American Indian 
tribes reflects my opportunity to present my ideas to a seminar at the University of Arkansas 
School of Law taught by Dean Stacy L. Leeds. Her seminar included some members of American 
Indian tribal councils who provided especially helpful perspectives on the issue. 
** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, The University 
of Texas School of Law; Professor of Government, The University of Texas at Austin. 
 1. The Constitution’s Immoral Compromise, Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 26, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/02/26/the-constitutions-immoral-compro 
mise. 
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of course, the Electoral College also). It can truly be said that one of the 
dominant questions before the delegates in Philadelphia was “who counts” 
(and, of course, how much they count). It has become almost a cliché that 
communities are human constructs rather than recognitions of what 
philosophers might call “natural kinds,”2 and much of the “American project” 
has always involved often acrimonious delineation of highly particularistic 
communities.3 
“Who counts” and, in addition, who feels that one is in fact “counted” as a 
member of a community, are basic questions of politics and, indeed, of almost 
all social organization. Perhaps readers can remember—maybe ruefully—
childhood “clubs” that depended as much on who was excluded as who was let 
in and, concomitantly, who felt the pleasures of inclusion as against the sting 
of exclusion. To put it mildly, the topic is an ambitious one, and this Lecture 
only skims the surface of its potential riches. So, as I thought about what I 
might want to discuss as the Childress lecturer, especially in the presence of 
other distinguished scholars, it occurred to me that an essential topic of the 
American past, present, and future is precisely “who counts” as part of the “We 
the People” in whose name the framers ostensibly spoke and drafted their 
constitutional text in 1787 and under whose aegis we continue to live today. I 
shall, however, roam beyond the United States at times, and beyond “standard-
form” political institutions to illustrate the ubiquity of the question and the 
complexity of proposed solutions. 
I.  ACCOUNTING FOR SLAVERY 
Given that this Lecture had its origins, in a sense, in the reality of a 
continuing debate over the Constitution’s Three-fifths Clause, it is appropriate 
to begin with a further exploration of the paradoxes contained within that 
debate. Although one should remember that almost all of the states 
countenanced slavery as of 1787, the big winners were the states heavily 
dependent on chattel slavery, such as Virginia and South Carolina.4 Many 
 
 2. See Alexander Bird & Emma Tobin, Natural Kinds, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2012), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/natural-kinds/ 
(“To say that a kind is natural is to say that it corresponds to a grouping or ordering that does not 
depend on humans.”). 
 3. An essential book on different forms of American community is ROGERS M. SMITH, 
CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 14 (1997). 
 4. See, e.g., the results of the 1790 census regarding the numbers of slaves in the various 
states. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, A CENTURY OF POPULATION GROWTH: FROM THE FIRST 
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE TWELFTH 1790–1900 132 (1909), available at 
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/00165897ch14.pdf. Only Massachusetts, 
Vermont, and Maine were free of slaves. Id. New Hampshire, for example, had 157 slaves. Id. 
Leading the pack, though, were Virginia with 292,627 slaves, with South Carolina second with 
107,094 slaves. Id. 
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historians ascribe Thomas Jefferson’s election in 1800 to the three-fifths bonus 
as reflected in the Electoral College.5 Had the slaves not been counted as part 
of the relevant population, all American history might well have taken a 
radically different course, including, of course, the genuine possibility that 
there would have been no Constitution at all and the consequent creation of at 
least two, perhaps three, separate countries. 
One might say that slaves counted, but only as three-fifths of non-slaves. 
But we immediately must confront a paradox surrounding this particular 
episode in American history: Anti-slavery forces properly argued that slaves 
should not count at all, whereas one can be certain that slave owners would 
have been delighted to have them count as the equivalent of five ordinary 
people. The reason is obvious: No one suggested that slaves would be able to 
vote. Nor, almost as significantly, could anyone seriously have suggested that 
slaves would be “virtually represented.” Such representation was evoked with 
regard to women or children, non-voting citizens who would, however, 
ostensibly be protected by others—fathers, brothers, and husbands—who 
would, it was argued, have both the psychological predisposition and moral 
obligation to take their interests into account when voting or otherwise 
engaging in politics.6 
No such claims were made with regard to slaves and their masters. What it 
meant to be a chattel slave was precisely that one was another’s property, 
entitled to no more solicitude, save that determined by naked self-interest, than 
other live chattels such as cattle or horses. A wise owner does not mistreat or 
starve his horses, for example, for they are usually productive assets. But not 
all owners were wise, and some, at least, no doubt derived sadistic pleasure 
from demonstrating the absolute dominion that “ownership” is thought to 
bring.7 So the debate had literally nothing to do with protecting the interests of 
those who were enslaved. Instead, it concerned only the ability of the actual 
electorate (and ruling elites) in a given state to benefit from the presence in 
 
 5. See GARRY WILLS, “NEGRO PRESIDENT”: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 1–4 
(2003) (demonstrating the importance of the three-fifths compromise to providing Jefferson the 
marginal eight electoral votes by which he defeated John Adams). 
 6. See, e.g., the forthright advice by an early 20th century Minnesota legislator that women 
“attach themselves to some man who will represent them in public affairs.” Voting Rights for 
Women: Pro- and Anti- Suffrage, EDSITEMENT!, http://edsitement.neh.gov/lesson-plan/voting-
rights-women-pro-and-anti-suffrage, (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). Of course, “attachment” was 
already present with regard to one’s father or brothers, who were also expected to act with 
suitable male chivalry. 
 7. A range of possibilities with regard to slave owners is well developed in 12 Years a 
Slave, though, importantly, none is willing to recognize the elemental injustice involved in chattel 
slavery. John Ridley, 12 Years a Slave: Best Adapted Screenplay 47–49, 64, 75 (2012). See also 
MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN HISTORY AND 
LITERATURE 1 (2003) (history of canonical North Carolina case establishing absolute dominion 
of slave owners). 
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their states of totally non-represented non-voters because of the enhanced 
political power counting them as “three-fifths persons” would provide these 
elites. They might “count” as part of the “apportionment census,”8 but no one 
imagined that they would, in fact, “count” as part of the community whose 
opinions or interests would ever be taken into account. To count them served 
the exclusive interest of slave owners (and their states), not at all the people 
purportedly “counted.” 
The paradox of “representing” slaves is underscored by the full text of the 
relevant constitutional text: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective 
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free 
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding 
Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.9 
Not only does it take care to include as full members of the “apportionment 
community” indentured servants, who continued to constitute a significant 
percentage of the labor force in 1787,10 it also excludes completely “Indians 
not taxed,” who are truly treated as non-persons. Perhaps this simply echoes 
the extent to which the “compromise” is not only about apportionment, but 
also about the ability of Congress to use its newly authorized taxing powers, 
which also included a three-fifths clause. After all, slaves could in theory be 
taxed as part of the chattel property of their owners, and counting them as only 
being worth three-fifths the notional value of other capital assets would be a 
boon to the would-be taxpayers.11 
Given that “non-assimilated” Indians were not taxed at all inasmuch as 
they were viewed as members of separate nations, albeit “domestic dependent” 
on the solicitude of the national government,12 they were, similarly, to be 
excluded from the census. We should also acknowledge the strong possibility 
that many, perhaps almost all, of the “Indians not taxed” had no desire at all to 
be included within the American community even in such a minimal way of 
 
 8. See Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-up in the Core of the 
Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3, 3 n.1, 13 (1998). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis 
added). 
 10. See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and 
Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 748, 750, 781 (1996). 
 11. As a matter of fact, this aspect of the three-fifths compromise ended up playing no real 
role in American public finance. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 26; see also Bruce 
Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4–6, 27–28 (1999) (arguing that 
“direct taxes” turned out to be almost completely unimportant in public finance, which, by 
definition, meant that the three-fifths tax clause also became irrelevant). 
 12. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831); Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 583 (1832), abrogated by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
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being counted as part of its census inasmuch as they viewed the “Americans” 
as an occupying army whose claim to power rested on force rather than right.13 
To be “counted” against one’s will as part of an alien community would 
certainly have not been perceived as an act of friendship.14 Indeed, “Indians” 
are not identified as such in the first six U.S. censuses taken by the United 
States between 1790–1840.15 Only beginning with the 1900 census were 
Indians living on reservations identified by the census.16 
Of course, the subject “who counts” also specially resonates in St. Louis; 
the splendid new downtown building of Saint Louis University School of Law 
is literally only blocks from what has come to be called by many the “Dred 
Scott Courthouse”; as we all know, the lawsuit brought by Scott eventuated in 
the declaration by the United States Supreme Court that no descendant of 
slaves, even if formally free, could be accounted as a member of the national 
American political/legal community,17 even if their bodies could continue to 
contribute to the enhanced political power, at least at the national level, of 
whites oppressing them. Interestingly enough, it appeared that even the Dred 
Scott majority accepted the reality that free blacks could be counted as part of a 
given state’s political community and even allowed to vote within those 
 
 13. John Marshall basically agreed in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584, 589 
(1823). 
 14. Indeed, Chief Justice Taney wrote as follows in Dred Scott, concerning “the Indian 
race,” which “formed no part of the colonial communities, and never amalgamated with them in 
social connections or in government” and who remained 
[A] free and independent people, associated together in nations or tribes, and governed by 
their own laws. Many of these political communities were situated in territories to which 
the white race claimed the ultimate right of dominion. But that claim was acknowledged 
to be subject to the right of the Indians to occupy it as long as they thought proper, and 
neither the English nor colonial Governments claimed or exercised any dominion over the 
tribe or nation by whom it was occupied, nor claimed the right to the possession of the 
territory, until the tribe or nation consented to cede it. These Indian Governments were 
regarded and treated as foreign Governments, as much so as if an ocean had separated the 
red man from the white; and their freedom has constantly been acknowledged, from the 
time of the first emigration to the English colonies to the present day, by the different 
Governments which succeeded each other. Treaties have been negotiated with them, and 
their alliance sought for in war; and the people who compose these Indian political 
communities have always been treated as foreigners not living under our Government. 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403–04 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. As to the nature of Indian “consent” to various treaties, see 
MICHAEL PAUL ROGIN, FATHERS AND CHILDREN: ANDREW JACKSON AND THE SUBJUGATION OF 
THE AMERICAN INDIAN XX (Transaction Publishers 2d ed. 1995) (1975); STUART BANNER, HOW 
THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER 127, 129 (2005). 
 15. American Indians in the Federal Decennial Census, 1790–1930, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES 
& RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/research/census/native-americans/1790-1930.html 
(last visited Dec. 27, 2013). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403, 407, 411. 
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states,18 but that was irrelevant so far as computing the more embracing 
national community of rightsholders. (At the very least, this underscores the 
complexity of answering the question “who counts” and invites the follow-up 
question “sez who.”) 
The Fourteenth Amendment overruled this aspect of Dred Scott, and the 
Fifteenth Amendment ostensibly made it illegal for states to deny at least 
African-American males the right to vote in elections. It is, of course, a 
historical truth that many feminists opposed both the Fourteenth and, 
especially, the Fifteenth Amendments precisely because one could view them 
as underscoring the proposition that women, albeit citizens, did not count as 
potential members of the American political community, save to the degree 
they were virtually represented or enjoyed certain limited rights as citizens.19 It 
would take another half-century for the Nineteenth Amendment to guarantee 
women the right to vote and whatever recognition the suffrage brings as a 
member of the community that “counts.” 
 
 18. See id. at 405. 
[A person] may have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and yet not 
be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State. For, previous to the 
adoption of the Constitution of the United States, every State had the undoubted right to 
confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen, and to endow him with all its 
rights. But this character of course was confined to the boundaries of the State, and gave 
him no rights or privileges in other States beyond those secured to him by the laws of 
nations and the comity of States. Nor have the several States surrendered the power of 
conferring these rights and privileges by adopting the Constitution of the United States. 
Each State may still confer them upon an alien, or any one it thinks proper, or upon any 
class or description of persons; yet he would not be a citizen in the sense in which that 
word is used in the Constitution of the United States, nor entitled to sue as such in one of 
its courts, nor to the privileges and immunities of a citizen in the other States. The rights 
which he would acquire would be restricted to the State which gave them. 
Id. 
 19. Thus the text of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly states, in relevant 
part: 
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice 
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being . . . citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the 
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). See also another Missouri case, Minor v. 
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165, 178 (1874) (women’s right to vote not guaranteed by the 
privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U. S. (16 
Wall.) 130, 130, 133, 139 (1872) (women not guaranteed the right to practice law if states wish to 
exclude them from the legal profession). 
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II.  SO WHO COUNTS AS AN “INDIAN”? 
Although Taney took great care to distinguish between American Indians 
and those we today call African-Americans, noting, for example, that at least 
some of the former could become American citizens,20 he took great care to 
limit the category of those who could count as Indian. Key in this regard is his 
altogether fascinating earlier opinion in United States v. Rogers rejecting the 
proposition that a white person could become an Indian.21 For Taney, it is fair 
to say, race was everything, trumping all other concerns. Indeed, Kenneth 
Prewitt, a distinguished political scientist and former director of the United 
States Census Bureau, has recently suggested that our fixation with racial 
identity may truly be part of what constitutes American exceptionalism.22 
“America [is] the only country in the world firmly wedded to an eighteenth-
century racial taxonomy,” he writes, that continues to structure a great deal of 
our public discussion and public policy.23 This taxonomy, by which one is 
assigned—counted as—a member of only one of the then-five constitutive 
races24 is on full display in Taney’s decision. 
As described by Taney, “William S. Rogers, a white man,” had been 
indicted for the murder of one “Jacob Nicholson, also a white man, in the 
country now occupied and allotted by the laws of the United States to the 
Cherokee Indians.”25 Rogers claimed that he had in effect emigrated “to the 
Cherokee country, and made it his home,” becoming, along the way, “a citizen 
of the Cherokee nation” as determined, of course, by the Cherokee nation 
itself.26 His status as a Cherokee citizen would mean that that Rogers would be 
exempt from the jurisdiction of the United States, because Congress had 
passed a criminal law that included a proviso that it would not “include 
punishment for ‘crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property 
of another Indian.’”27 Because Nicholson “had in like manner become a 
Cherokee Indian,” Rogers claimed that the United States court was without 
jurisdiction to try him.28 Perhaps you will permit me to add as an aside that one 
 
 20. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404 (“But they may, without doubt, like the subjects of any other 
foreign Government, be naturalized by the authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, 
and of the United States; and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his 
abode among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which 
would belong to an emigrant from any other foreign people.”). 
 21. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572–73 (1846). 
 22. KENNETH PREWITT, WHAT IS YOUR RACE?: THE CENSUS AND OUR FLAWED EFFORTS 
TO CLASSIFY AMERICANS 8 (2013). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. at 14–17. 
 25. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 571. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 567. 
 28. Id. at 571. 
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reason I love law is that the facts of cases are so endlessly fascinating. One 
does not need to engage in exotic hypotheticals. The world itself is so 
remarkably interesting! 
In any event, Taney (and the Court) did not buy Rogers’s argument. “[W]e 
think it very clear, that a white man who at mature age is adopted in an Indian 
tribe does not thereby become an Indian, and was not intended to be embraced 
in the exception above mentioned.”29 For Taney—and is this surprising?—we 
are dealing with what a later generation would learn to call “essentialism,” and 
part of “being an Indian” is presumably skin color, as evidenced in the 
controversial name of the professional football team of our Nation’s capital.30 
Presumably, once white, always white, at least for purposes of the particular 
federal statute. (I am not aware what Taney’s views would have been with 
regard to a free black who “emigrated” to the Cherokee Nation.) Even if one 
stipulates that Rogers “by such adoption [became] entitled to certain privileges 
in the tribe, and [made] himself amenable to their laws and usages,”31 that is 
basically irrelevant. 
Yet he is not an Indian; and the exception is confined to those who by the 
usages and customs of the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race. It 
does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally,— of the family 
of Indians; and it intended to leave them both, as regarded their own tribe, and 
other tribes also, to be governed by Indian usages and customs. . . .32 
Rogers, however, “was still a white man, of the white race, and therefore not 
within the exception in the act of Congress.”33 Presumably, the Cherokee 
viewed their identity as “political” as well as “racial,” with a concomitant right 
attaching to the Cherokee Nation, like any other political entity, to welcome 
newcomers even if they were initially not part of the Nation. One theorist of 
British parliamentary sovereignty famously declared that “[i]t is a fundamental 
principle with English lawyers, that Parliament can do everything but make a 
woman a man, and a man a woman.”34 It similarly appears that the Cherokee 
Nation, even if one deems it to have at least some attributes of “sovereignty,” 
cannot, according to Taney, change a white man into an Indian. 
 
 29. Id. at 572–73. Imagine if the sentence instead read: “We think it very clear that an Italian 
who at mature age is granted citizenship in the United States does not thereby become an 
American.” 
 30. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Call an Audible, Dan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2013, at A29 
(joining with those calling on Dan Snyder, the owner of the “Washington Redskins,” to change 
the name that increasing numbers of people find offensive). 
 31. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573. 
 32. Id. (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. 
 34. ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 41 (8th ed., 1915) (quoting DeLolme). 
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Questions as to “who counts as an Indian” have scarcely disappeared. 
Indeed, they have taken on special import in a number of the over-500 
registered American Indian tribes35 in the United States inasmuch as they are 
attempting to disenroll some of their putative membership. That is, the specific 
question is not who is within the broad category of “American Indian,” a 
question similar, perhaps, to deciding who precisely in the modern world 
counts as a “European” or “African”—in the latter context think especially of 
the status of Afrikaners in South Africa—but, rather, who count as members of 
very specific tribes. For whatever reason—though one may strongly suspect 
that access to revenues generated by casinos on Indian reservations is at least 
part of the explanation—persons who have thought that they are members in 
good standing of given tribes have been faced with attempts by tribal leaders to 
remove them from the rolls on grounds that they do not, after all, meet the 
prerequisites for being considered a “genuine” X.36 That is, it is even possible, 
I presume, that one might be regarded as “an Indian” by, say, the United States 
Census, but that no particular tribe would offer a home. One California tribe, 
the Chukchansi, has been described as terminating the membership of “almost 
75% of their tribe.”37 An article tellingly titled “Disenrollment Has Been the 
Scourge of Tribes Since the Advent of Casino Gaming” details efforts within 
the “tiny Sauk-Suiattle” tribe located in the State of Washington to “disenroll 
306 members—allegedly because they are part-Filipino.”38 A spokesperson for 
those challenging their disenrollment describes this as “ethnic cleansing pure 
and simple,” an effort “to wash the Filipino blood out of the Nooksack 
Tribe.”39 One potential victim of disenrollment has described the process as 
“genocide.”40 Those who defend disenrollment no doubt offer different 
analyses and descriptions. 
Quite obviously, the same set of questions has been endlessly presented in 
American social and legal experience with regard to other forms of racial 
identity. Was, for example, Homer Plessy really an African-American and 
therefore subject to being banished to the railway car reserved for that race? He 
 
 35. As of 2012, there were apparently 566 officially recognized American Tribes in the 
United States. List of Federally Recognized Tribes, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
List_of_federally_recognized_tribes (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
 36. See, e.g., James Dao, In California, Indian Tribes With Casino Money Eject Thousands 
of Members, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at A20. 
 37. Matt Driscoll, Comment of the Day, Disenrollment Has Been the Scourge of Tribes 
Since the Advent of Casino Gaming, SEATTLE WEEKLY (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.seattleweek 
ly.com/news/thedailyweekly/943055-129/commentoftheday. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Gale Courey Toensing, Nooksack Indian Tribe in Disenrollment Fight, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK.COM (Apr. 11, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianet 
work.com/2013/04/11/nooksack-indian-tribe-disenrollment-fight-148742. 
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seems to have been what New Orleansians, who had exquisitely calibrated 
ways of measuring racial identity, called an “octoroon,” that is, like Sally 
Hemings, Thomas Jefferson’s inamorata,41 a person with a single black 
grandparent, and therefore, under the infamous “single drop of blood” rule, 
“black,” even if it appears that his appearance would have led many onlookers 
to ascribe a different racial identity. That is, he might well have been able to 
“pass” into whiteness had that been his desire.42 Or consider a notorious set of 
citizenship cases from the 1920s, which turned on whether a “high caste” 
Brahmin from India or an immigrant from Japan were “white” and therefore 
eligible for citizenship under American naturalization laws that, at the time, 
limited citizenship only to whites and a small category of black immigrants 
from Africa.43 The answer in both cases was no. 
One must also recall in this context Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent in 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, involving the operation of a federal-level affirmative 
action law directed to “citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.”44 One of Justice Stevens’s 
arguments concerned the difficulty, if not near-impossibility, of defining with 
confidence those who count and those who do not with regard to the ethnic or 
racial groups in question.45 Stevens described “the very attempt to define with 
precision a beneficiary’s qualifying racial characteristics [as] repugnant to our 
constitutional ideals.”46 It should already be crystal clear, though, this is an 
utterly false statement, at least with regard to the enacted tradition of American 
constitutional doctrine; nothing is more American, so to speak, than a near 
obsession with precise definition of racial characteristics in determining who 
counts as an X. In any event, Justice Stevens went on to suggest, with what 
was undoubtedly self-conscious provocation, that “[i]f the National 
Government is to make a serious effort to define racial classes by criteria that 
 
 41. See ANNETTE GORDON-REED, THE HEMINGS OF MONTICELLO 16–17 (2009). 
 42. RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND 
ADOPTION 281–338 (2003) [hereinafter INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES]; Randall Kennedy, Racial 
Passing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1145 (2001); see generally, PHILIP ROTH, THE HUMAN STAIN 
(2000); see also GORDON-REED, supra note 41, at 586–605 (noting that many of Sally Heming’s 
(and, presumably, Thomas Jefferson’s) descendants chose to “pass” even as others maintained 
conscious affiliation with the African-American community). 
 43. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206, 215 (1923) (“a high caste Hindu of full 
Indian blood”); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 184, 198 (1922) (“clearly of a race which 
is not Caucasian”), both cases discussed in Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
404, 412–13 (2012); see also IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION 
OF RACE 56–77 (rev. & updated 10th anniversary ed., 2006) (discussing Ozawa and Thind). 
 44. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 535 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. at 535–36. It would presumably be far easier to identify those who are “Spanish-
speaking,” but then one must explain why they deserve special preference. 
 46. Id. at 534 n.5. 
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can be administered objectively, it must study precedents such as the First 
Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935 . . . .”47 
Indeed, let me confess that I believed that the collapse of affirmative action 
as a policy would not be the result of the force of the philosophical or political 
arguments against using it to rectify past injustice in America or to achieve 
necessary diversity in a variety of institutional settings, including, very 
importantly, the military. I am in basic agreement with most of the arguments 
on behalf of “affirmative action” that are well set out by Randall Kennedy in 
his recent book For Discrimination.48 Rather, I thought that the collapse would 
be the result of the distinctly practical problems in defining who qualifies—
who counts—which, as anyone who has ever been involved in actually 
administering such programs knows, can be quite excruciating. 
III.  ILLEGAL ALIENS AND OTHER “FILLER PEOPLE” 
A particularly volatile question at present involves so-called “illegal 
aliens,” i.e., the millions of people who are in this country either having 
entered it illegally or, quite commonly, overstayed their visas after a fully legal 
entry (and who, obviously, can be distinguished from the Rehnquistian 
community of “quasi citizens”49). Do they “count”? Quite obviously they are 
not part of the electorate. Indeed, neither are altogether lawful resident aliens, 
though, as a matter of fact, it is not self-evident why resident aliens should be 
deprived of a right to take part in decisions that clearly affect their lives.50 
After all, some states prior to 1926 did allow resident aliens in the process of 
becoming U.S. citizens to vote, and even now a few communities in the U.S. 
do allow non-citizen suffrage in local elections.51 
But consider the fact that illegal aliens, however defined, are counted as 
part of the national census and, more importantly, are included in the so-called 
“apportionment population” that defines how many representatives (and, 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE 
LAW (2013). 
 49. See, e.g., John P. Feldmeier, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Constitutional Alchemy 
of the Fourth Amendment, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 521, 536–37 (1991). 
 50. I earlier explored some of these questions in Suffrage and Community: Who Should 
Vote?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 545 (1989). Some localities allow resident aliens to vote in local 
elections. David C. Earnest, Noncitizen Voting Rights: A Survey of an Emerging Democratic 
Norm, Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Aug. 29, 2003, available at http://ww2.odu.edu/~dearnest/pdfs/Ear 
nest_APSA_2003.pdf. The California Assembly has recently passed a bill that would allow 
resident aliens to serve on juries, though Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the measure. Jennifer 
Medina, Veto Halts Bill for Jury Duty by Noncitizens, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2013, at A1. 
 51. Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and 
Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1397 (1993); see also Earnest, 
supra note 50. 
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recall, votes in the Electoral College) states are entitled to. This is produced, 
roughly, by dividing the entire “apportionment population” by 385, the number 
of members of the House of Representatives remaining after 50 members are 
set aside to ensure each state has their constitutionally guaranteed minimum.52 
Interestingly enough, the “apportionment population” does not include the 
populations of the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico, even though they are 
composed overwhelmingly of United States citizens.53 As geographical 
entities, however, they are not represented in Congress,54 which apparently 
makes all the difference. Even though voters in the District of Columbia, 
thanks to the Twenty-third Amendment, can choose three electors who will in 
turn elect the President, that is apparently irrelevant so far as computing the 
“apportionment population” is concerned.55 It should not occasion surprise, 
incidentally, that many District of Columbia license plates include the motto 
“Taxation without Representation,”56 which is simply the ability to be 
“counted” when decisions to tax are made by a legislature. 
A report by the Department of Homeland Security estimated that in 
January 2010 there were approximately 10.8 million illegal aliens in the United 
States, with approximately 2.6 million and 1.8 million residing in California 
and Texas, respectively.57 Given that each state is awarded a congressional 
 
 52. Congressional Apportionment: How It’s Calculated, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/about/how.html (last updated Feb. 4, 2013). 
 53. Congressional Apportionment: Frequently Asked Questions, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/about/faq.html (last updated Feb. 4, 2013). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1. 
 56. See, e.g., Tim Craig, Obama to Use D.C. ‘Taxation without Representation’ License 
Plates, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/obama-to-
use-dc-taxation-without-representation-license-plates/2013/01/15/f91b09ac-5f5b-11e2-9940-
6fc488f3fecd_story.html. 
 57. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT 
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2010, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
4 tbl.4 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ 
ill_pe_2010.pdf. Two authors, writing in the Wall Street Journal in 2009, suggesting that 
counting illegal aliens in the 2010 census would be unconstitutional, offered strikingly different 
numbers: 
  According to the latest American Community Survey [produced by the Bureau of the 
Census], California has 5,622,422 noncitizens in its population of 36,264,467. Based on 
our round-number projection of a decade-end population in that state of 37,000,000 
(including 5,750,000 noncitizens), California would have 57 members in the newly 
reapportioned U.S. House of Representatives. 
  However, with noncitizens not included for purposes of reapportionment, California 
would have 48 House seats (based on an estimated 308 million total population in 2010 
with 283 million citizens, or 650,000 citizens per House seat). Using a similar projection, 
Texas would have 38 House members with noncitizens included. With only citizens 
counted, it would be entitled to 34 members. 
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district for roughly each 700,000 residents (i.e., not citizens, let alone voting-
eligible citizens58), this means that California gets at least three “extra” 
representatives (and electoral votes) and Texas two, thanks to their illegal 
residents. 
It is not a “self-evident truth,” so to speak, that illegal aliens should be 
counted as part of the “apportionment population.” The reason is surely not 
because they do not possess genuine interests that might well be taken into 
account by truly disinterested “representatives.” They most certainly do. But I 
think it is fair to suggest that the dominant theory of representation in this 
country, often articulated by public officials themselves, is that their job is to 
respond to, perhaps even to mirror, the preferences of voting constituents.59 
Even if members of Congress in fact deviate from this model on occasion, it is 
rare indeed to find members proudly proclaiming that they will vote on the 
basis of what they think best for the country even if this runs contrary to the 
wishes of the constituents on whom they depend for re-election. 
This mode of self-presentation (and, often, actual behavior that might be 
explained by an instinct for political self-preservation as well) may be 
defended on the basis of an overtly normative theory of representation or, more 
practically, simply by reference to a “rational choice” model that focuses on 
the incentives that organize blocs of potential voters (or contributors) can 
provide to officials to take their particular interests into account. If Yale 
Professor David Mayhew is correct that most members of Congress are 
motivated above all by the desire to be re-elected,60 then it is exceedingly 
difficult to explain why those we call “representatives” would ever take into 
 
John S. Baker & Elliott Stonecipher, Our Unconstitutional Census, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2009, 
at A11. It should be glaringly obvious—and a central theme of this Lecture—that the precise 
numbers offered by the American Community Survey cannot be taken seriously, even if one 
grants that their numbers are, broadly speaking, more accurate than those of the Department of 
Homeland Security, simply given inevitable barriers in the way to conducting any census, let 
alone one that requires people who are in this country illegally to admit their status. It would be 
like reading a survey that allegedly determined that 22,132,469—not one more, not one less—
persons had committed adultery last year. Surely most Americans—or at least those who have 
learned from NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL—
BUT SOME DON’T (2012), about margins of error in public opinion polling—know that even the 
best-conducted surveys can strive only for relative accuracy, which means, by definition, that 
another iteration of the same poll could end up with quite different results. That being said, it 
remains a powerful point to be able to say, with a certain degree of confidence, that there are 
probably at least five million undocumented aliens in California, a number considerably higher 
than the estimate produced by the Department of Homeland Security. 
 58. Joseph Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 YALE L. J. 1888, 1890–91 (2012). 
 59. See, e.g., Barbara Sinclair, An Effective Congress and Effective Members: What Does it 
Take?, 29 AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 435 (Sept. 1996), available at http://www.congresslink.org/ 
print_expert_effectivecongress.htm. 
 60. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13–19 (1974). 
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account the interests of non-voters, especially if, in contrast to teenagers, there 
is no likelihood that they might become voters in the relatively near future. 
Moreover, illegal aliens may be a classic “discrete and insular minorit[y]”61 
who are often the objects of fear and discrimination by the voting population 
and public officials mirroring those views. That is, active hostility replaces a 
sometimes benign indifference.62 As may be true more often than we would 
like to believe, the courts are no more eager to protect such minorities than are 
other political institutions.63 
Similar concerns might be raised with regard to American citizens who are 
disqualified from voting, as is the case with convicted felons in many 
American states. It is a sad play on words to say, for example, that the 
prisoners herded together in Huntsville, Texas, or other centers of incarceration 
in the United States are “represented” by the legislators who prevail in 
elections.64 They “count” only to provide extra political power to privileged 
voters (many in Huntsville who have become dependent on what might well be 
called the “prison-industrial complex”). Had the Supreme Court, in the past 
fifty years, ever deigned to explain what it really meant by the adage one-
person/one-vote, perhaps one could even say that such counts are 
 
 61. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). See J. M. Balkin, 
The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 281 (1989) (describing the significance of footnote four in 
Carolene Products). 
 62. Professor Cohen raises a fascinating question in her contribution to this symposium. 
“Somebody is doing some work to represent the interests of undocumented immigrants,” she 
writes. Elizabeth F. Cohen, Dilemmas of Representation, Citizenship, and Semi-citizenship, 58 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1047, 1065 (2014). “Otherwise they wouldn’t be getting drivers licenses in 
some states, being regularized by infrequent but important amnesties, and receiving various other 
benefits. This is not to say that their semi-citizenship constitutes a fully just arrangement. It is 
simply an observation that representation occurs in the absence of the franchise.” Id. (citations 
omitted). Presumably, one could offer similar observations about almost any formally excluded 
group inasmuch as there may be some people within the political system who, for whatever 
reason, take up their cause. Consider, e.g., abolitionists and slaves, or members of the American 
Civil Liberties Union who defend the rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses. If it is important to be 
reminded of such realities, it surely cannot be sufficient to become complacent, and Professor 
Cohen herself reminds us that what she aptly terms “semi-citizenship” may rarely “constitute[] a 
fully just arrangement.” Id. And she concludes her article by noting that “the most successful 
instances of trusteeship described in this article are those that move toward or end in the 
enfranchisement of different semi-citizens.” Id. at 1069. 
 63. See, e.g., L.A. Powe, Jr., Does Footnote Four Describe?, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 
197–98 (1994). 
 64. See, e.g., Peter Wagner, Breaking the Census: Redistricting in an Era of Mass 
Incarceration, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1241, 1241 (2012) (demonstrating the importance not 
only of “who counts,” but also where they are counted). 
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unconstitutional, but the Court has consistently given us a large number of 
near-arbitrary decisions in lieu of genuinely coherent opinions.65 
In any event, we might legitimately compare the “illegal alien” and 
“disenfranchised felons” bonuses, in their practical political effects, to the 
three-fifths bonus, at least in some states and legislative districts. Indeed, given 
that both illegal aliens and disenfranchised felons are counted as whole 
persons, it might be even more appropriately compared to the “segregation 
bonus” that reinforced the post-1877 power of Southern states, returned to 
white supremacy, even more than had been the case previously; each former 
slave might now be counted as a whole person.66 But particularly by the turn of 
the 20th century, the great majority of former slaves were denied the right to 
vote in the formerly Confederate states, with dreadful consequences not only 
for the affected African-Americans but for the American political system as a 
whole.67 Congress was for decades significantly controlled by congressional 
Southern Democrats determined to prevent any national programs from aiding 
African-Americans (who were in no serious sense “constituents”).68 
The text of the Fifteenth Amendment had become what James Madison 
dismissively termed (referring, of course, to other parts of the Constitution) a 
“parchment barrier.”69 As Justice Holmes asserted in the too-little-studied case 
Giles v. Harris,70 one could scarcely expect the Supreme Court, without the 
resources, as Hamilton put it, of “sword or the purse,”71 to enforce the 
Amendment in the teeth of systematic state opposition, including ruthless 
violence directed against those African-Americans who wished to participate 
in the political process,72 coupled with no apparent will on the part of Congress 
or the executive to re-engage in the arduous task of Reconstruction, i.e., 
 
 65. Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. 
REV. 1269 (2002). The most thorough judicial discussion can be found in Judge Kozinski’s 
concurring and dissenting opinion in Garza v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 779–88 (9th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991). 
 66. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE 
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910 (2d ed. 1975) 
(describing efforts to restrict the voting rights of former slaves). 
 67. Id. at 42–44. 
 68. IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 15–16 
(2013). 
 69. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 245–46 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 
2008). 
 70. 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903); see Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the 
Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 296–97 (2000) (discussing the impact of Giles and attempts 
to “airbrush” the case from the constitutional canon). 
 71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 69, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 72. See, e.g., DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, THE WARS OF RECONSTRUCTION: THE BRIEF, 
VIOLENT HISTORY OF AMERICA’S MOST PROGRESSIVE ERA 284–320 (2014). 
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genuine “regime change.”73 Never has an ostensibly defeated adversary 
enjoyed such political fruits that typically go only to the victorious. 
It took a war to rid the country of slavery; it would take a mighty post-
World War II movement, including the violence it elicited and concomitant 
belated response by both President and Congress, to make the Fifteenth 
Amendment a genuine reality in American constitutional politics and therefore 
to allow, say, Alabama and Mississippi African-Americans truly to count as 
part of the polity. Part of that reality was the Voting Rights Act of 1965,74 now 
under relentless assault by a Supreme Court that can be described as either 
ignorant of, or simply indifferent to, the history of the United States with 
regard to this aspect of determining “who counts” as anything more than the 
mere subject of enumeration.75 With regard to the ability of even adult citizens 
to vote, one cannot be confident that contemporary states are fully willing to 
let every person count as a full participant in the community.76 
College students, for example, have been especially subject to explicit 
legal efforts denying them the right to vote in college towns, as delineated in a 
New York Times editorial aptly titled “Keeping Students from the Polls.”77 It 
quoted the Republican Speaker of the New Hampshire House of 
Representatives, who described students as “foolish” because they “vote their 
feelings” instead of being guided, as older adults presumably are, by stern 
logic and the lessons of experience.78 “‘Voting as a liberal,’ he said, ‘that’s 
what kids do.’”79 The relevant response, even more than attempting to 
persuade them that liberal views are mistakes, which, of course, might take 
years, is to say that their votes simply will not count in any venue besides that 
of their original home. This response to student voters, incidentally, underlines 
the importance of specific voting systems in determining what it means to 
“count” or, concomitantly, not count. 
The United States is in a minority at least of major countries around the 
world that elects officials almost exclusively by geographical area (as well as 
determination of winners by First Past The Post (“FPTP”), rather than 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. See, e.g., 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 160–
173 (2014) (underscoring the centrality of the Voting Rights Act to the Civil Rights Revolution). 
 75. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628–29 (2013). 
 76. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About 
Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 58, 60–61, 65 (2014) (outlining several contemporary attempts by state legislatures to 
exclude certain groups from electoral participation). 
 77. Editorial, Keeping Students from the Polls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2011, at A18. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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prevailing in a run-off),80 which is, among other things, why partisan 
gerrymandering especially afflicts American politics. This is “American 
exceptionalism” with a vengeance. If, on the other hand, we adopted a system 
of nation-wide proportional representation or, even better, like Germany or 
New Zealand, mixed systems of geography-based and state- or nation-wide 
proportional representation,81 then it would be a matter of near indifference 
whether students voted in, say, Hanover, New Hampshire, the home of 
Dartmouth College, or some other locale within the state, save, of course, for 
issues of local importance. 
As a practical matter, geographical representation guarantees that de facto 
permanent minorities, whether identified by race, ethnicity, or, just as 
importantly, ideology, will not effectively “count” within the electorate even if 
they get to cast ballots in the general election.82 The “real” elections will, as we 
increasingly see, take place in political primaries rather than the often basically 
meaningless general elections.83 It is glaringly obvious that “representatives” 
have no genuine incentives to respond to the needs of illegal aliens unless, as is 
sometimes the case, their voting constituents believe, for whatever reason, that 
those needs should be met.84 But, increasingly, it is hard to believe that 
representatives in most congressional districts within our polarized political 
system have any incentive to respond to the views of voting citizens who can 
 
 80. See the valuable compilation of electoral systems around the world at Table of Electoral 
Systems Worldwide, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, http://www.idea. 
int/esd/world.cfm (last updated Oct. 14, 2010). See also Nils-Christian Bormann & Matt Golder, 
Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946–2011, 32 ELECTORAL STUD. 360, 364 
(2013), available at https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/es3.pdf. 
 81. The New Zealand system of MMP (mixed member proportional representation) is 
explained at The MMP Voting System: Mixed Member Proportional, ELECTORAL COMM’N., 
http://www.mmpreview.org.nz/sites/all/themes/referendum/resources/Fact-Sheet_MMP.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2014). On Germany, see Leon Mangasarian, How Germany’s Election System 
Works: What to Watch for Today, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2013, 10:01 PM), http://www.bloom 
berg.com/news/2013-09-21/how-germany-s-election-system-works-what-to-watch-for-
today.html. 
 82. See James Thomas Tucker, Redefining American Democracy: Do Alternative Voting 
Systems Capture the True Meaning of “Representation”?, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 357, 385–86 
(2002) (concluding that geographic representation has come to contradict the basic principle that 
“all powers of government must be derived from the consent of the governed” and that some form 
of proportional representation would remedy the failings of geographic representation); James 
Thomas Tucker, Affirmative Action and [Mis]representation: Part II—Deconstructing the 
Obstructionist Vision of the Right to Vote, 43 HOW. L.J. 405, 470 (2000) (noting that, under the 
United States’ winner-take-all elections, votes for losing candidates are essentially “wasted”). 
 83. Burt Neuborne, Felix Frankfurter’s Revenge: An Accidental Democracy Built by Judges, 
35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 602, 645 (2011) (arguing, among other things, that the 
Supreme Court’s history of allowing major political parties to “rig” the candidate selection 
process in gerrymandered districts often renders general elections “meaningless”). 
 84. See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text. 
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easily be described as members of a permanent minority who will never 
genuinely provide an electoral threat. 
It is important, to be sure, that one’s vote “be counted” rather than torn up, 
but it often turns out that merely having one’s vote tabulated does not come 
close to providing a sense that one truly “counts” as someone, for example, 
whom a so-called “representative” truly has to care about. This also captures 
the distinctly different senses of “being counted,” which include, but are not 
limited to, being part of an enumeration or even of the formal electorate. 
Instead, one must be treated as if one has certain dignitary-legal rights that 
allow persons to feel psychologically that “they count” as part of a relevant 
moral, and not only numerical, community. To be told, in effect, that one 
“counts” only to serve the interests of others is one definition of “humiliation.” 
It is relevant that Bruce Ackerman, in his recent book The Civil Rights 
Revolution, locates the meaning of Brown v. Board of Education85 above all as 
signaling an attack on what Senator Hubert Humphrey, speaking ten years later 
in behalf of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, called the “monstrous humiliations 
and inconveniences that racial discrimination imposes on our Negro fellow 
citizens.”86 
Some years ago, Sam Issacharoff and Alex Aleinikoff coined the 
marvelous but disturbing term “filler people” to refer to hapless minorities who 
are placed in legislative districts for the purpose of fulfilling the Supreme 
Court’s mechanistic mandate of “equal population” but who are otherwise 
expected to play no genuine role in selecting public officials.87 As someone 
who is such a “filler person” in my congressional district that includes part of 
Austin, I in no way at all feel that the invariably conservative Republican 
 
 85. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 86. ACKERMAN, supra note 74, at 136. 
 87. T. Alexander Alienikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing 
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 601, 631 (1993). Pamela Karlan 
explains: 
The term “filler people,” which Sam Issacharoff coined, refers to the fact that because one 
person, one vote requires that all districts have the same population, while the need to 
avoid “packing” means that most deliberately drawn majority-nonwhite districts are 
somewhere between fifty-one and sixty-five percent nonwhite, a substantial number of 
other people (usually members of the white majority, but sometimes members of other 
racial or ethnic groups) must be assigned to these districts in order to top off the total 
population at a constitutionally acceptable level. 
Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 114 
YALE L. J. 1329, 1342 n. 61 (2005). Although the term “filler people” might have initially been 
used in the context of “racial gerrymandering,” it is obviously applicable to all instances of 
gerrymandering, where the point of artful gerrymanderers is to fill a given district with just 
enough reliable voters from their own party to guarantee electoral success, while at the same time 
not “wasting” such voters by “packing” an excess number in those districts. Better to distribute 
them in other districts while using members of the opposition party as the hapless “filler people.” 
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winner is my “representative.”88 To be reduced to the status of a “filler person” 
is to underscore the extent to which one does not count, save in an almost 
irrelevant literal sense. Election day, in fact, exemplifies one’s humiliation at 
the hands of legislative redistricters determined to assure that those with 
certain political views will not count as part of the “real” electorate even as 
they are counted as part of the formal electorate. 
No doubt one can find ruthless examples by Democrats trying to make sure 
that only a minimum of Republicans will “count” as more than “filler people.” 
The overall phenomenon is surely bi-partisan, even though, as a contingent 
result of the 2010 elections, it was members of the Republican Party who 
achieved “one-party” control of a number of states insofar as both the 
legislature and governor shared the same partisan interests, and they were thus 
able to take better advantage than Democrats of the decennial reapportionment 
follies.89 This helps to explain, for example, why the House of Representatives 
has a 33-seat Republican majority even though Democrats nationally received 
approximately 1.7 million more votes than Republican candidates.90 The most 
dramatic single example of the consequences of partisan gerrymandering is 
surely Pennsylvania. The very same day that saw President Obama carrying 
Pennsylvania by 52% of the total vote, and Democratic Senator Bob Casey 
winning re-election with more than 53%, also observed Republican victories in 
thirteen out of the eighteen congressional districts.91 So much for the 
proposition that all votes, as a practical matter, count equally. As Jonathan Still 
argued in a brilliant article several decades ago, the only voting systems that 
come close to meeting a norm of equality of voting power are those adopting 
 
 88. Indeed, as I wrote in the original draft of my Lecture, quoted by Professor Finkelman: 
I can say that I don’t even know my Congressman’s name. Why should I? In no way do I 
feel “represented” by him. I do not genuinely count, except in the most unhelpfully literal 
sense, and this is precisely what was intended by Texas Republicans who engaged in 
ruthlessly partisan gerrymandering consciously designed to make Austin the largest city 
in the country without a ‘representative’ it can genuinely call its own. 
Paul Finkelman, Who Counted, Who Voted, and Who Could They Vote for, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1071, 1072 (2014). 
 89. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 76, at 62 (quoting the state of Texas’s open admission that 
redistricting measures were aimed at minimizing the Democratic votes that actually count). 
 90. See FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2012: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. 
SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FED. ELEC. COMM’N 3, 11 (July 2013), 
available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalelections2012.pdf (showing 60,252,696 
votes for House Democratic candidates and 58,541,130 votes for House Republican candidates). 
 91. 2012 Pennsylvania Presidential Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2012-
election/results/president/pennsylvania/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2012, 2:48 PM); 2012 
Pennsylvania Senate Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2012-election/results/senate/ 
pennsylvania/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2012, 2:48 PM); 2012 Pennsylvania House Results, 
POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2012-election/results/house/pennsylvania/ (last updated Nov. 
19, 2012, 2:48 PM). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
956 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:937 
proportional representation,92 a voting system with very little support in the 
United States. 
With due respect, one of the most surely obtuse paragraphs in the history 
of the United States Reports is the following from Justice White’s plurality 
opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, which, as a practical matter, gave carte blanche 
to state legislatures to engage in ruthlessly partisan gerrymanders: 
[T]he mere fact that a particular apportionment scheme makes it more difficult 
for a particular group in a particular district to elect the representatives of its 
choice does not render that scheme constitutionally infirm. This conviction, in 
turn, stems from a perception that the power to influence the political process 
is not limited to winning elections. An individual or a group of individuals who 
votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed to be adequately represented by 
the winning candidate and to have as much opportunity to influence that 
candidate as other voters in the district. We cannot presume in such a 
situation, without actual proof to the contrary, that the candidate elected will 
entirely ignore the interests of those voters. This is true even in a safe district 
where the losing group loses election after election.93 
If one is truly “adequately represented” by whoever is elected, then it is hard to 
understand the effort put into electing one candidate over another. This is 
Burke’s “trustee” theory of representation with a vengeance,94 in which we 
may have little or no say in choosing (or firing) our trustee but should, 
nonetheless, feel that our interests are being “adequately” taken into account. 
Even if one implausibly assumes that Justice White’s “perception” made a 
modicum of sense a quarter-century ago, it surely makes none today. One can 
be certain, though, that this empirical disconnect would have no effect on the 
 
 92. Jonathan W. Still, Political Equality and Election Systems, 91 ETHICS 375, 384–85 
(1981). 
 93. 478 U.S. 109, 131–32 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 94. See Edmund Burke, Mr. Burke’s Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in 3 THE WORKS AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 232, 236–37 (1852). Professor 
Cohen, in her valuable contribution, suggests that this Childress Essay “speaks primarily of the 
delegate model of representation and tacitly defends this model of representation,” as against the 
“trustee” model of representation. Cohen, supra note 62, at 1057–58. To the extent this is true, it 
is not because I necessarily reject the normative attractiveness of the trusteeship model. At the 
very least, a workable republican form of government depends on the ability of ordinary citizens, 
let alone their leaders, to discipline their own selfish egoistic preferences on behalf of some kind 
of commitment to the “public interest.” This point is well made in a recent book by HÉLÈNE 
LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REASON: POLITICS, COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE RULE OF 
THE MANY 192 (2013) (“[O]ne can expect that [citizens] will go beyond their own self-interest 
and toward the good of the community as a whole”). The central problem may be the ability of 
self-interested groups of citizens, perhaps those identified as “factions” by James Madison, see 
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 69, at 49 (James Madison), to play a decisive role in 
electoral politics and thus generate “representatives” who feel constrained to mirror the 
preferences of their most avid supporters. Full discussion of this point could obviously take a 
book of its own. 
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current Supreme Court, which often “deems” things to be true that lack any 
foundation in demonstrable reality. 
My illustrations so far have been taken from what might be described as 
standard-form American politics of the kind that lend themselves to litigation 
and, with some frequency, important decisions by the United States Supreme 
Court. There are full-scale courses taught at a number of law schools on 
election law or, perhaps sarcastically, “the law of democracy,” that include 
copious references to many decisions of the Supreme Court. But I am 
interested in far more than the constitutional law of the United States. 
IV.  WHY LOOK BEYOND THE UNITED STATES? 
There were other, less Constitution or United States-oriented, stimuli that 
encouraged me to choose “Who Counts?” as my title. In March of 2013, the 
conservative economist Tyler Cowen wrote a remarkable column in The New 
York Times critical of one aspect of the debate about immigration policy 
currently roiling the country, which is how we compute the costs and benefits 
attached to any particular policy.95 What was especially striking, given the 
common pose of economists as descriptive positivists unconcerned with 
normative questions, was Professor Cowen’s identification of the problem as 
raising “an overriding moral issue”: 
Imagine that it is your professional duty to report a cost-benefit analysis of 
liberalizing immigration policy. You wouldn’t dream of producing a study that 
counted “men only” or “whites only,” at least not without specific, clearly 
stated reasons for dividing the data. 
  So why report cost-benefit results only for United States citizens or 
residents, as is sometimes done in analyses of both international trade and 
migration? The nation-state is a good practical institution, but it does not 
provide the final moral delineation of which people count and which do not.96 
As already suggested, many of our great debates, as with Dred Scott and 
subsequent amendments dealing with suffrage, have properly concerned “who 
counts” as a part of “We the People,” and the answers might differ, for 
example, depending on whether we are determining who can participate in 
popular decision-making by voting, or who can claim certain rights even if, 
like women in 1868 or resident aliens and children today, they cannot vote.97 
Cowen’s striking comment, however, reminds us that it is less than a self-
evident truth that the only people whose welfare we—that is, members of the 
 
 95. Tyler Cowen, A Profession with an Egalitarian Core, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2013, at 
BU4. 
 96. Id. (emphasis added). 
 97. See Note, The Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1078, 1088 (2013) (identifying several competing definitions of “The People” that have been 
recognized by the Supreme Court). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
958 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:937 
American political community—should focus on are our fellow Americans. To 
be sure, perhaps the Constitution allows us to be stunningly parochial in our 
accounting, but, as Cowen correctly notes, there are serious moral issues 
attached to any such position. 
Consider in this context a recent comment by Glenn Greenwald, whose 
politics are presumably quite different from Cowen’s but who makes a 
basically similar point. In an exchange with Bill Keller in The New York Times, 
Greenwald writes that in deciding what classified information newspapers 
should publish or agree to keep secret, he would not “give added weight to the 
lives of innocent Americans as compared to the lives of innocent non-
Americans, nor would [he] feel any special fealty to the U.S. government as 
opposed to other governments when deciding what to publish.”98 Perhaps one 
should recall in this context Samuel Johnson’s famous comment that 
“Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel,” even as we should be reminded 
that in the fourth edition of his famous dictionary, he defined a patriot as 
“[o]ne whose ruling passion is the love of his country.”99 But, of course, that 
leaves open the question of whether “his country”—or any country (and its 
citizens or residents)—deserves to be the object of unconditional commitment 
to the exclusion of outsiders. To decide “who counts” and on what basis, raises 
obviously fundamental questions of both political theory and the most practical 
of political considerations. 
Quite obviously, a number of important legal doctrines turn on whether 
one is a U.S. national or an alien, including, perhaps most importantly for 
millions of the latter, the possibility of being deported.100 But it is worth noting 
as well the contemporary importance of doctrines where “being counted” as a 
member of the rights-bearing community increasingly depends on whether one 
is physically within the United States. This is most dramatic with regard to the 
claimed “right” of the United States to engage in targeted assassinations via 
drone strikes, even of American citizens in foreign lands who are deemed 
sufficiently adverse to the interests of the United States.101 
 
 98. Bill Keller, Is Glenn Greenwald the Future of News?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/opinion/a-conversation-in-lieu-of-a-column.html?pagewant 
ed=all&_r=0. 
 99. 2 JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. 158 (Heritage Press 1963); 
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 527 (abr. 4th ed., Barnes & 
Noble Books 1994). 
 100. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1050–51 (1994) (noting the importance of citizenship or alienage for 
immigrants in accessing government benefits or engaging in political processes); Julia Preston, 
Number of Illegal Immigrants in U.S. May Be on Rise Again, Estimates Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
24, 2013, at A16. 
 101. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the killing by the United States in 
Yemen of Anwar Al-Awlaki, see Feisal G. Mohamed, A Farewell to Due Process: The 
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This is “most dramatic” because of the literal presence of issues involving 
life or death. But consider also in this context recent debates over the gathering 
of “metadata”—or, indeed, the direct tapping of phone conversations.102 These 
appear to turn on whether the objects of coverage are, for example, Germans in 
Germany or Brazilians in Brazil. The unspoken premise seems to be that 
foreigners living abroad have no rights—or, at least, no rights under the United 
States Constitution—that American officials are bound to respect. As Chief 
Justice Rehnquist put it in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, a case dealing 
with whether Fourth Amendment constraints operate with regard to warrantless 
searches by members of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency at all, that 
Amendment applies only to those “who are part of a national community or 
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be 
considered part of that community.”103 Outsiders are out of luck. Their 
interests, at least legally speaking, are of no account. 
Indeed, one of the remarkable aspects of this claim is that it extends to the 
highest status members of these countries, including their Chancellors or 
Presidents.104 It may be incredibly dumb—at least if there is a prospect of 
getting caught—to listen in on ostensibly private cell phone conversations of 
these leaders, but, presumably, they have no greater privacy rights vis-à-vis 
American eavesdropping than any other member of their polity, which is to say 
none at all. To suggest the opposite, Eric Posner has suggested, is to adopt a 
“sneaking cosmopolitanism” on the part of the Supreme Court by which the 
judiciary begins enforcing particularistic American rights even with regard to 
foreigners living abroad.105 Generally speaking, though, only members of the 
 
Assassination of Anwar Al-Awlaki, Huffington Post (Oct. 3, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.huff 
ingtonpost.com/feisal-g-mohamed/anwar-al-awlaki-killed_b_989485.html. 
 102. See, e.g., RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE 
GOVERNMENT DOES WITH AMERICANS’ DATA 9 (2013), available at http://www.brennancen 
ter.org/publication/what-government-does-americans-data. 
 103. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). 
 104. See, e.g., Mark Mazetti and David E. Sanger, Tap on Merkel Provides Peek at Vast Spy 
Net, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 2013, at A1 (detailing wiretapping of German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel); Alison Smale, Anger Growing Among Allies on U.S. Spying, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2013, 
at A1 (noting anger of Brazilian President). But see RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., LIBERTY AND 
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S 
REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 151–62 (Dec. 12, 
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_re 
port.pdf (discussing privacy protections to be granted “non-U.S. persons”); id. at 170–73 
(discussing “Recommendation 19,” dealing with procedures for surveillance of “foreign 
leaders”). 
 105. Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism 16 
(Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 228, 2008), available at 
http://law.uchicago.edu/files/files/pl228.pdf. I owe this reference to Anna Su, Speech Beyond 
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“national demos,” which “consists of American citizens at home and abroad, 
plus various quasi-citizens such as lawful permanent residents,” should be 
viewed as part of the rights-bearing community (though Congress, of course, 
can choose to extend certain protections to whomever it wishes).106 
Can we possibly be surprised to discover a great deal of resentment at the 
discovery by citizens of countries ostensibly closely allied with the United 
States that they simply “don’t count” when it comes time to identify “the 
people” who are protected by the Fourth Amendment or the “person[s]” 
protected against arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the 
Fourteenth Amendment?107 This is, obviously, not a question of whether the 
United States census should include Germans, but, as suggested by Cowen and 
Greenwald, whether they should “count” as members of a transnational 
community with whom we are inevitably intertwined and whose interests we 
are truly obliged to take into account. And, of course, even if we determine that 
disregarding their rights-claims—or those of the U.S. national Al-Awlaki—is 
the legally correct determination, it remains questionable, as Cowen suggests, 
whether Americans should applaud a government that speaks in their name 
while adopting a policy of basically blithe indifference to the moral rights of 
foreigners. As any legal positivist would argue, that one has a legal right to do 
something does not in the least determine that one ought to exercise that 
right.108 
Once one begins looking around and asking “who counts?” the examples 
are almost endless. In fact, just a week before my visit to St. Louis, the 
Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic in effect declared that 
hundreds of thousands of persons of Haitian descent, many of them born 
within the Dominican Republican, could not become citizens of the Dominican 
Republic.109 Approximately 200,000 people seem potentially affected by this 
decision, which has been condemned by human rights activists.110 “We the 
People” of the Dominican Republican apparently do not include many natives 
 
Borders: Extraterritoriality and the First Amendment (2013) (unpublished paper) (on file with 
author). 
 106. Id. 
 107. I am grateful to Professor Philip Heymann for making this point in conversation. For one 
illustration of what turns out to be U.S. untrustworthiness with regard to a willingness to breach 
privacy, see James Glanz, U.S. Can Spy on Britons Despite Pact, Memo Says, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
21, 2013, at A20. 
 108. This is one of the issues on which Professors H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin certainly 
agreed. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 210–11 (3d ed., 2012) (discussing the 
importance of separating law and morality); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
191 (17th prtg. 1999) (1977) (pointing out that enjoyment of a right does not depend on its 
contribution to social welfare). 
 109. See Randal C. Archibold, Dominicans of Haitian Descent Cast Into Legal Limbo by 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2013, at A1. 
 110. Id. 
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whom the Dominican Republic state prefers to count as being “really” Haitian. 
Whether or not they will continue to be formally counted in the next census in 
the Dominican Republic (perhaps as “resident aliens”), they surely believe that 
they have suffered a stunning blow to their dignitary interest in “counting,” not 
to mention the more practical problems attached to living in a country that 
refuses to countenance the possibility of naturalization. Certain countries 
ranging from Switzerland and Germany to Japan have historically been 
extremely hesitant to allow naturalization, though Germany in 2000 broadened 
its policy to take account of especially Turkish “guest workers” who had put 
down deep roots within that country.111 But we know that the concept of 
“sovereignty” has historically entailed not only control of one’s borders, but 
also plenary authority to determine who is eligible for entrance into the 
community. This, after all, is the point of Dred Scott.112 
V.  WHO IS A JEW? 
As it happens, I am very interested in Israel and the operation of the so-
called “Law of Return,” which grants automatic citizenship to any Jew who 
emigrates to that country.113 Putting entirely to one side the extremely 
important issues surrounding the extent to which Israel should be viewed as a 
“Jewish state” instead of a “binational” one, composed (at least) of Jews and 
Arabs who must learn to live in peace with one another in a quite small area of 
land—which raises the question of who should count as a “genuine Israeli”—
there remains the vital question, “Who is a Jew?” Although it might take on 
 
 111. See Marc Morjé Howard, The Causes and Consequences of Germany’s New Citizenship 
Law, 17 GERMAN POLITICS 41, 41, 44, 54 (2008). 
 112. See also New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 110 (1837), which has copious references to 
such sovereign power. See also Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 
130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889), which upholds shockingly unjust treatment of a Chinese resident of the 
United States seeking re-entry after a visit in China on the basis of the inherent sovereign power 
of the United States to break its word both to the individual litigant and to China more broadly by 
virtue of Congress’s passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act. 
 113. The initial “Law of Return” passed at the initiation of the State of Israel was amended in 
1970 to provide explicitly that “[f]or the purposes of this Law, ‘Jew’ means a person who was 
born of a Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another 
religion.” Law of Return amend. 2, § 4B, 5730-1970, SH No. 586 p. 34 (Isr.) [hereinafter Law of 
Return], available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/1950-1959/Pages/Law%20of%20Re 
turn%205710-1950.aspx. Germany also had a similar law. See ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP 
AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 170 (1992) (noting that the West German 
“constitutional definition of ethnic German refugees as ‘Germans’ . . . has become, in effect, a 
‘law of return’ for ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union”). 
Brubaker notes the insistence of Germany historically in rejecting the notion of jus soli, by which 
“who counts” as a citizen is determined simply by place of birth, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1, in favor of jus sanguinis, in which “who counts” is determined by the extent to which 
one shares the favored ethno-national blood line. BRUBAKER, supra, at 81. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
962 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:937 
heightened importance because of the existence of Israel and its Law of 
Return, it would be significant even were there no State of Israel. What is an 
important political/legal question in that country is an important sociological 
and institutional question for many other Jews around the world. 
First, the politics: “Who counts” as a member of the Jewish community 
translates into an entitlement to immigrate to Israel and, quite remarkably, be 
treated as a full citizen literally from the day of arrival with intention to 
remain. As a matter of empirical fact, one can be completely non-observant or 
atheistic in one’s theological beliefs, but remain a Jew according to Jewish 
(and Israeli) law if born to a Jewish mother.114 As a matter of fact, “who 
counts” under the Israeli “law of return” is considerably trickier inasmuch as 
descendants of Jews, including “a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse 
of a Jew, [and] the spouse of a child of a Jew” are also authorized to claim a 
right of entry “except for a person who has been a Jew and has voluntarily 
changed his religion.”115 This presumably is what allowed many Russian 
“Jews,” who had no Jewish education or tradition of observing traditional 
Jewish law (and, quite possibly, no belief in God) to emigrate if they could 
establish the requisite lineage, so long, of course, as they had never formally 
adhered to another religion. It is worth noting, incidentally, that the Reform 
wing of American Judaism has since 1983 rejected the exclusive emphasis on 
matrilineal heritage and treats as Jewish anyone born to a Jewish father and 
“raised as a Jew and [who] receives a Jewish education and celebrates 
appropriate life cycle events, such as receiving a Hebrew name and becoming 
bar or bat mitzvah. This also assumes that the child is being raised exclusively 
as a Jew and not practicing another religion.”116 It is worth noting that at least 
some children are being raised as members of two religious faiths, one of 
which is Judaism.117 Does the requirement of “exclusivity” make them 
ineligible for Israeli citizenship? 
Hovering over any answer to the previous question is the status of “Jews 
for Jesus,” if born to a Jewish mother. Are they entitled to entry? The answer, 
as a matter of positive Israeli law, is no. There may be relatively few 
theological propositions indelibly linked to “being Jewish,” but rejection of the 
 
 114. Law of Return, supra note 113. 
 115. Id. § 4A(a). 
 116. Patrilineal Descent, REFORM JUDAISM, http://www.reformjudaism.org/ask-rabbi-topic/ 
patrilineal-descent (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). 
 117. See, e.g., Susan Katz Miller, Op-Ed., Being ‘Partly Jewish’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2013, 
at A23. Her op-ed begins as follows: 
In the course of a year, my family celebrates Yom Kippur, Rosh Hashana, Sukkot, Simhat 
Torah, Hanukkah, Passover and many Shabbats. We also celebrate All Saints’ Day and 
All Souls, Advent, Christmas, Lent and Easter. We are part of a growing movement to 
raise interfaith children with both family religions. 
Id. 
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claims of Jesus to be the Messiah is one of them, at least from the perspective 
of established leaders of those recognized as speaking for the “Jewish 
community.”118 An atheist obviously has no trouble rejecting Christian 
Messianism. What, however, about Brother Daniel, who was “born Jewish,” 
that is, the son of a Jewish mother, but later converted to Catholicism, as was 
the case, incidentally, with Aaron Lustiger,119 who at his death was Cardinal 
Joseph Lustiger, Archbishop of Paris? Perhaps for obvious reasons, Cardinal 
Lustiger was delighted to remain in Paris, but Brother Daniel attempted to 
move to Israel under the Law of Return. His case is well described at the 
Jewish Virtual Library in an entry on “Who is a Jew”: 
Brother Daniel (born Oswald Rufeisen), a Jew who converted to Christianity 
during the Holocaust and had become a Carmelite Monk. During his youth, 
Rufeisen was active in a Zionist youth movement and fled to Vilna, Lithuania 
at the start of World War II. There he worked as a slave laborer and escaped to 
Mir where he worked for the police as a translator. Rufeisen took advantage of 
his position and smuggled arms to his Jewish friends and helped drive the 
police out from Mir before it was liquidated, saving nearly 300 Jews. Rufeisen 
hid in the forest and later a convent, where he decided to convert to 
Christianity. In 1962, Rufeisen, now Brother Daniel, applied to immigrate to 
Israel and, after being denied, he appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court ruled that despite the fact he was born to a Jewish mother, he had since 
converted and should not be recognized as a Jew by the State of Israel.120 
It would be truly bizarre if Brother Daniel, because of his heroism during 
World War II, had been named a “righteous Gentile” by Yad Vashem, the 
central museum devoted to the Holocaust in Jerusalem, given that that he 
apparently had not converted when he performed at least some of his 
wonderful acts.121 
As one might expect, the “Brother Daniel case” was scarcely the last 
episode involving defining who counted as a Jew within Israel. There were, for 
example, hosts of refugees from the former Soviet Union—and, before that, 
Ethiopia122—whose Jewish bona fides (whatever one might think might 
 
 118. See, e.g., James D. Davis, Campaign Disturbs Jewish Leaders, Sun Sentinel (Nov. 4, 
2003), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2003-11-04/news/0311040018_1_jewish-groups-jewish-
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 122. Isabel Kershner, Second-Generation Ethiopians in Israel March Toward Dream of 
Acceptance, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2012, at 12. 
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establish them) were dubious but whose welcome was politically necessary.123 
And, unlike the case with refugees from Ethiopia, the immigrant community 
from the former Soviet Union has had significant—and some would say 
deleterious—consequences for the development of Israeli politics and the 
possibility of achieving a long-term resolution of the antagonism between the 
Arab and Jewish communities in Israel and Palestine. There might be few 
better examples of what Benedict Anderson famously called “imagined 
communities,”124 which only underlines the extent to which “peoplehood” is 
truly a socially and politically constructed category. And this suggests that 
power—and not simply debate—will account for the decisions that are actually 
made. 
VI.  ON “ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPTS”: DO FETUSES AND ORCAS 
COUNT, AND WHY OR WHY NOT? 
It is worth noting that what remains probably the most profoundly divisive 
issue in American politics centrally requires one to determine “who counts.” 
Thus, whatever other questions are raised by the issue of abortion, the most 
fundamental is whether—or perhaps when—an embryo becomes a “person” 
who is, under the Constitution (or simply most philosophical systems), entitled 
to some degree of protection.125 Consider in this context the Life at Conception 
Act of 2013, introduced by sixteen Republican senators, which provides that 
“[t]he terms ‘human person’ and ‘human being’ include each member of the 
species homo sapiens at all stages of life, including the moment of fertilization, 
cloning, or other moment at which an individual member of the human species 
comes into being.”126 An obvious question is whether these “persons” are to 
count in the “reapportionment census,” especially if they are being carried by 
American citizens who will presumably pass along their status as members of 
the American political community to the newborns at birth. If one agrees with 
the sponsors of the Life at Conception Act (which perhaps should be renamed 
the “Personhood at Conception Act”), it seems easier to defend including these 
not-yet-fully-emerged-but-nonetheless-legal-persons within the apportionment 
census than to defend including illegal aliens. 
Consider as well in this context two recent, albeit so far unsuccessful, 
lawsuits that have been filed in behalf of non-humans. The first, reported in a 
New York Times story tellingly titled The Humanity of Nonhumans, describes 
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claims for writs of habeas corpus filed by the Nonhuman Rights Project “on 
behalf of four captive chimpanzees.”127 The lawyers relied “heavily on 
science,” particularly with regard to “what research says about the lives, 
thinking ability and self-awareness of chimpanzees.”128 The article also 
referred to a conference held at Yale on December 6–8, 2013 on “Personhood 
Beyond the Human,” which, by definition, invites us to expand our ordinary 
categories of “who counts” as a “person.”129 Quite obviously, such an 
expansion raises extremely complicated questions of philosophy, not to 
mention politics. It can occasion no surprise not only that the New York State 
trial judge quickly dismissed the suit, though noting that the lawyers’ 
“impassioned representations to the Court are quite impressive,” but also that 
the Project has immediately announced that it is appealing the decision to the 
next rung of the state judiciary.130 
One might also mull over a lawsuit filed by People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals claiming that orcas kept at SeaWorld and other such 
venues have a claim under the Thirteenth Amendment’s seemingly near-
absolute ban on slavery.131 After all, the text of the Amendment categorically 
prohibits “slavery” and “involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”132 Is it dispositive 
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that the orcas in question do not, at least at present, meet the criteria we use for 
“persons,” a word, after all, that makes no appearance in the Thirteenth 
Amendment? One can scarcely ignore the existence of persons making serious 
and sophisticated arguments for “animal rights,” which, at the end of the day, 
is an appeal that we count animals as part of our community of sentient beings 
capable not only of feeling pain, but even, in the “higher echelons,” of entering 
into genuine relationships that trigger recognizable emotional bonds (and 
griefs).133 If we did regard orcas as beings with rights, we could scarcely deny 
that they are in fact being kept in conditions of slavery, even if one concedes, 
arguendo, that their conditions of confinement could in fact be worse than they 
are. Indeed, even if one rejected 18th and early 19th century notions of 
“slavery” that saw “chattel slavery” as only one form of illegitimate 
domination worthy of being labeled “slavery,” one would have little difficulty 
analogizing orcas to chattel slaves as opposed, say, to wage slaves.134 One 
might well believe that adherents of such views are as marginal today as, say, 
devotees of Garrisonian abolition were in 1830, but that hardly counts as 
evidence that their arguments are foolish. I suspect that almost all of us worry 
about which views we now possess will be dismissed with contempt by future 
generations. 
So consider a quite stunning quotation from one of the great political 
scientists and democratic theorists of the 20th century, the late Yale Professor 
Robert Dahl. It comes from his 1970 book After the Revolution?: Authority in 
a Good Society, written, as the date suggests, in the aftermath of various 
important political movements attacking the socio-political status quo both in 
the United States and abroad.135 “[H]ow to decide who legitimately make up 
‘the people,’” he wrote, “is a problem almost totally neglected by all the great 
political philosophers who write about democracy.”136 Writing four decades 
later, Professor Jason Frank suggests that “the problem haunts all theories of 
democracy . . . . [I]t is not a question the people can procedurally decide 
because the very question subverts the premises of its resolution.”137 As Frank 
notes in a brilliant analysis of Frederick Douglass, America has always 
 
 133. See, e.g., ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass R. 
Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004). See also Gregory Berns, Op-Ed., Dogs Are People, 
Too, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at 5 (“The ability to experience positive emotions, like love and 
attachment, would mean that dogs have a level of sentience comparable to that of a human 
child.”). 
 134. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2012) (contending that original notions of “slavery” extended to all 
illegitimate domination and not only to chattel slavery). 
 135. ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION?: AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY (1970). 
 136. Id. at 60, quoted in JASON FRANK, CONSTITUENT MOMENTS: ENACTING THE PEOPLE IN 
POSTREVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 2 (2010). 
 137. FRANK, supra note 136. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] “WHO COUNTS?” “SEZ WHO?” 967 
confronted the reality of marginalized, even, as Ralph Ellison so memorably 
put it, “invisible” men, who have demanded entry into the group of “We the 
People”—even as many of those “People” resisted, sometimes with force of 
arms, any such efforts.138 Frank quotes political theorist Danielle Allen, who 
writes, “Democratic politics . . . cannot take shape until ‘the people’ is 
imaginable.”139 The development of the requisite imagination, though, is not an 
anodyne process simply of analysis. It may be the result instead not only of 
mass movements but even of violence. After all, just as Dr. Johnson noted the 
clarifying effects of knowing that one is to be hung in the morning,140 being hit 
by a two-by-four may also do wonders with regard to recognizing the existence 
of someone one otherwise wishes to ignore (and refuse to count). 
We must also recognize, though, that even if we could, as if by magic, 
agree on who constituted any given community, that would only reinforce the 
implausibility of claims by presumptive outsiders that they should actually be 
treated as if inside. As Linda Bosniak, an astute student of issues surrounding 
citizenship, puts it, “To the extent that we express our ideals of justice and 
democratic belonging by way of the concept of citizenship, we need to be 
particularly sensitive to the questions of exclusion implicated in the 
discussion.”141 Every “inside(r)” structurally relies on an “outside(r),” who, 
especially if we are devotees of Carl Schmitt, becomes potentially transformed 
into a mortal enemy (or, at least, subject to our ceaseless listening in to all 
conversations).142 This is precisely what made Cowen’s and Greenwald’s 
moral critiques of conventional cost-benefit analysis so powerful. 
But it turns out that the identity of “the people,” or even “a people,” as 
with, for example, given ethnic groups or American Indian tribes, is what 
political theorists have learned to call an “essentially contested concept,” 
which by definition is proved impervious to definitive resolution.143 Consider 
the laconic comment by the Canadian Supreme Court, in its landmark decision 
examining the legitimacy, under the Canadian constitution, of claims by 
Quebec that it might possess a unilateral right of secession.144 The basis of 
such a claim is the ostensible right of “self-determination by the people of 
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Quebec,” to which the Court responded that “the precise meaning of the term 
‘people’ remains somewhat uncertain.”145 And one reason for the contestation 
is that the particular concept often has a valence, usually positive, though 
sometimes negative, so that classification as a member of some community X 
is thought to be either a high compliment or the assignment of a stigmatic 
identity. But, quite obviously, another reason for contestation is that the 
deepest considerations of practical politics, as well as abstract intellectual 
concerns, may be implicated by any answer. Claims of self-determination, if 
accepted, can easily create havoc in the international political system, not to 
mention the lives of people on the ground who are viewed as not being within 
the particular community of “selves” entitled to craft their own futures.146 Such 
questions are almost stunningly obvious when we consider claims by Frederick 
Douglass and other African-American leaders to be considered as part of “We 
the People.”147 
But consider also some of the responses in the 1840s to the so-called “Dorr 
Rebellion” in Rhode Island, which turned precisely on who would count as a 
member of the state electorate. Dorr and his followers, speaking in the 
language of the Declaration of Independence and the importance of 
government by consent of the governed—not to mention the right to establish 
new forms of government to replace those that were oppressive—objected to 
the highly restricted electorate established by the 1663 Charter under which 
Rhode Island continued to operate into the 1840s.148 Those without property 
simply did not count when determining who would lead Rhode Island.149 It did 
not help that they not only failed to possess enough wealth, but many were also 
Catholic immigrants (who had become citizens under U.S. naturalization 
law).150 Thus free-suffrage activists were denounced by Aurilla Moffitt, the 
wife of a Providence stable-keeper (who herself was, of course, deprived of the 
suffrage because of her sex), for in effect delivering the state “to the tender 
mercies of Roman Catholic foreigners who [could] be bought and sold by their 
employers” and who were, in addition, at “the beck and call of their priests.”151 
If one agreed with such descriptions, why indeed should such persons “count” 
as part of the Republican political order presumably privileged by the 
Constitution? Such an order rested on sturdily independent citizens, and she 
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expressed quite traditional concerns that such independence was lacking on the 
part of those in conditions of subordination to employers or submissive to the 
claims of an authoritarian priesthood (an exemplification of the kind of foreign 
“potentate” whose authority had to be “repudiated” by anyone becoming a 
naturalized citizen).152 
Many Dorrites, including Dorr himself, were anti-slavery and supported 
black suffrage, though, alas, the drafters of the so-called “People’s 
Constitution,” including Dorr, ultimately concluded that political prudence—as 
in Philadelphia in 1787—counseled submitting to the perception that most 
Rhode Islanders were too racist to accept such a radical proposal.153 
But this submission to perceived racist imperatives—which, incidentally, 
led most Abolitionists to oppose the People’s Constitution—was not enough to 
protect the Dorrites against nationwide condemnation from those concerned to 
bolster what became known as the Slavocracy, whether because of a belief in 
the virtues of slavery or, more likely, to maintain the Union by honoring the 
original deal struck in Philadelphia. Thus the Madisonian, described as the 
house organ of the administration of President John Tyler (who would support 
the Confederacy two decades later), savaged Dorr’s “doctrine” of “numbers” 
that would, if taken fully seriously, “at once convert the numberless blacks of 
the South into voters, who would vote down the southern state governments at 
their pleasures.”154 
It is worth noting, incidentally, that the Southern slaves were not 
“numberless” in the sense, say, that grains of sand or stars in the skies are. One 
source, for example, states that there were exactly 2,481,390 slaves in the 
American South in 1840.155 Given that the white population (plus the 
population of free blacks) was considerably less than twice this amount, this 
was more than enough to make even a hint of “one person/one vote” 
thoroughly subversive. According to Henry Clay, for example, the capacious 
answer given by Dorrites to the question “who counts” would “overturn all 
social organization, make Revolution, [which should be] the extreme and last 
resort of an oppressed people—the constant occurrence of human life, and the 
standing order of the day.”156 After all, as he told an audience in Richmond, 
Indiana while defending his own continued ownership of slaves, if slaves 
became free, they might follow Dorrite doctrine and start arguing that “an 
undefined majority have at their pleasure, the right to subvert an existing 
government, and institute a new one in its place,” leading, Clay suggested, to 
 
 152. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 193 (2d ed. 2011). 
 153. CHAPUT, supra note 148, at 59. 
 154. Id. at 146. 
 155. Jenny Bourne, Slavery in the United States, EH.NET (Oct. 19, 2013), http://eh.net/ency 
clopedia/slavery-in-the-united-states/. 
 156. CHAPUT, supra note 148, at 146–47. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
970 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:937 
the “complete subjection to the blacks.”157 One might note, incidentally, that 
just such a doctrine of the right of a majority “to subvert an existing 
government” whenever necessary to achieve public happiness is enunciated in 
the Declaration of Independence158 and, perhaps equally importantly, in 
Federalist No. 40, where Madison defends the disregard by the delegates to the 
Philadelphia Convention of the limits imposed by the Articles of 
Confederation.159 
One implication of this argument is that it remains crucially important to 
define who is part of “the people,” “the public,” or any potential voting 
majority in order to make certain that stability and the existing social order will 
be maintained. Madison, after all, emphasized that the delegates to the 
Convention were drawn from “patriotic and respectable citizen[s],”160 and not 
the wider body of his countrymen, for whom he expressed often undisguised 
contempt.161 Professor Frank tellingly quotes another Founder, John Adams, 
dismissing a popular Boston mob as only “a motley rabble of saucy boys, 
negroes and mulattoes, Irish Teagues, and outlandish jacktars.”162 Surely no 
right-thinking civic could believe that such a motley crew could actually 
“count.” 
So one implication of the question “who counts” suggests that we begin 
with a “candidate” for a particular designation—American, Jew, Indian, 
African-American, or, beyond that, “human being” or even “member of the 
trans-species community of ‘right-bearing beings’”—and attempt to construct 
a conceptual apparatus that will allow us to determine the answer. In spite of 
the obvious fact that there are shelves of books—and, no doubt, many seminars 
in college catalogues, especially given by philosophers—devoted to 
developing such concepts, one can still wonder if that is simply a fool’s errand. 
The “essence” of “essentially contested concepts,” after all, is that there is no 
prospect for genuine closure to arguments about what they “really mean.” 
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There is only endless argumentation, not least because there is no agreed-upon 
set of facts that are determinative. 
Recall DeLolme’s singular limitation of parliamentary sovereignty, the 
ostensibly unbreachable division between male and female.163 Even today 
there are surely some people who believe that one’s chromosomes provide a 
definitive answer to the question whether one is male or female, and it is 
altogether likely that even fifty years ago that would have been regarded as a 
knockdown argument with regard to gender identity. Today many, perhaps 
most, of us—i.e., readers of law review articles like this one—have a 
considerably more complex set of understandings. Not only are chromosomes 
more complicated than we once thought—the world, it turns out, is not divided 
neatly between XX’s and XY’s—but we realize as well that the self-identity of 
many persons is not imposed by chromosomal realities. So “who counts” as a 
member of a sex- or gender- or identity-related group is now a matter of 
profound debate. Just as we now accept the terms “multi-racial” and “bi-
sexual,” with regard to sexual orientation, perhaps we will one day equally 
accept “multi-sexual” or “multi-gender” with regard to sexual identity. In any 
event, we find ourselves, even with regard to categories of sexuality and 
gender, in the realm of “imagined communities” rather than what philosophers 
would call simple “natural kinds” to which imagination must simply submit on 
pain of being deemed irrational. 
Just as we almost certainly will never agree on exactly what constitutes 
“democracy,” for example—or, to take an example closer to the heart of law 
students and professors, what is the “real meaning” of “equal protection”164—
perhaps we must recognize the futility of attempting to arrive at a single 
definition of the terms I have already raised. Perhaps the best we can do is to 
say that some person (or being) A is an X for certain purposes, but not for 
others. This is, after all, one implication of the Equal Protection Clause itself: 
If persons “similarly situated” are entitled to “equal treatment,” then it is 
entailed that persons “dissimilarly situated” in some relevant respect can 
receive differential treatment. Context is all. 
Law students are often (rightly) confused by very specific legal rules or 
doctrines that seem to be in tension, if not outright contradiction, with other 
rules or doctrines. I sometimes refer to these as the “irregular verbs” within the 
law; as with such verbs, which must simply be memorized inasmuch as they do 
not follow standard forms of conjugation, students must memorize certain 
specific legal rules rather than remain confident that they can always deduce 
the correct answers by reference to some broad legal concept. Consider that 
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resident aliens are constitutionally entitled to serve as lawyers,165 but not as 
school teachers.166 There is no good theory that explains the difference, only a 
set of Supreme Court decisions in which, to be altogether accurate, one or two 
“swing justices” appear to see differences that are less than obvious to the rest 
of us (including the majority of their colleagues). 
As law professors (and students), we are often critical of what we are 
tempted to describe as irrational features of the law; I certainly do not hesitate 
to denounce much of the Supreme Court’s redistricting jurisprudence as 
incoherent. But perhaps we should all be more charitable, and not only because 
“to err is human.” Such charity may be the implication of Justice Holmes’s 
reminder that the “life of the law” is “experience,” rather than “logic,”167 and, 
of course, that applies to far more than simply the life of the law. It is true of 
life writ large, however frustrating that might be to system- and closure-
seeking academics. And experience is inevitably messy and in many ways 
fundamentally illogical, at least if we try to reduce our behavior to overarching 
philosophical systems with neatly rank-ordered priorities. 
But, of course, one can scarcely stop here by throwing up our hands in 
recognition of the complexity of the world. Decisions must be made with 
regard to all of the questions posed above: Who is (and is not) a “genuine 
American,” for whatever purposes; who is (or is not) a Jew, an Indian, an 
African-American, or a male or female, or a “person”? Even if there are those 
who believe, I think wrongly, that we should move toward a culture and law of 
“color-blindness” that would rule out of order any and all references to racial 
or ethnic identity, one can obviously make no sense of a demand directed to 
institutional religions that they simply drop any inquiry as to whether a 
proposed congregant—or rabbi, priest, or imam—is “truly” a member of the 
faith community. Would we, for example, really deny the Catholic Church a 
right to excommunicate persons it deems as having betrayed essential 
attributes of the faith? Those who disclaim the importance of “color” as a 
determinant attribute surely cannot coherently mean that one must reject any 
and all attributive aspects of identity. They themselves turn out to share the 
American fixation on color, even if they insist that they want to efface its 
relevance. Instead we inevitably return, perhaps like moths to the flame, to the 
equally frustrating question, what attributes count—or should count—in 
determining “who counts”? 
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VII.  ENTER INSTITUTIONS—AND THE PROBLEM OF “SEZ WHO?” 
When presented with frustrating questions, it is always tempting to believe 
that the answer lies in accepting some given institution or other external 
authority as the legitimate source of a definitive answer. Indeed, even the first 
part of this lecture has scarcely been able to avoid reference to institutional 
decisions, whether of the Supreme Court in the Rogers case or the State of 
Israel with regard to eligibility under the Law of Return. And it is telling that 
the 1970 amendment to that law included a laconic “definition” that purported 
to settle the question of “who counts” as a Jew. This is, after all, one appeal of 
dictionaries. What counts as the meaning of a particular term in a statute or the 
Constitution? For Justice Scalia, especially, the purported answer often lies in 
turning to a literally authoritative dictionary.168 
Perhaps far more to the point is the claim by the Supreme Court of the 
United States itself that disputes as to legal meanings are to be settled by 
reference to its own decisions. Over the past half-century especially, the Court 
has strongly insisted on its status as the “ultimate interpreter” of the 
Constitution, dismissing, often with near contempt, the proposition that other 
institutions, including the Congress of the United States, are entitled to their 
determinations of what the essentially contestable language of the Constitution 
might mean.169 Many people might be grateful; I dare say that law students are 
often comforted by the perception that one can determine the meaning of Equal 
Protection of the Law simply by reading an “authoritative” decision of the 
Supreme Court, even if it garnered only five votes and provoked vehement 
dissent.170 
I have analogized this view of the Supreme Court to the role played by the 
Papacy within (at least “official”) Roman Catholicism. What historically 
distinguishes Catholicism from Protestantism, after all, is not only the different 
emphasis placed on tradition as against the text of the Christian Bible, but also 
the equally important differences of belief regarding institutional authority. For 
so-called “dissenting Protestants” especially, the notion of “the priesthood of 
all believers” places interpretive authority in each and every member of the 
faith community.171 That is obviously altogether different from the tenets of 
the Catholic Church, where authority lies in the teaching magisterium of the 
Church, as instantiated in the Vatican and, ultimately, a Pope who is authorized 
to issue ostensibly “infallible” pronouncements when speaking ex cathedra on 
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matters of faith and morals.172 What this last question points to is that one 
answer to the question “who counts” lies in referring to one or another external 
authority—often an institution whose authority is self-legitimating, as it were, 
rather than the demonstrated capacities of any particular members at the time. 
In any event, one might hope that some suitable institution will be given—
or seize—the right to determine “who counts” as an X. That is, it will do the 
counting for the rest of us, whose task now is simply to accept whatever count 
ensues.173 The institutional Catholic Church, through its power not only to 
baptize but, equally important in this context, also to negate one’s claimed 
Catholic identification through the process of excommunication, can determine 
“who counts” as a Catholic. If someone who is excommunicated asks “sez 
who?” the answer is obvious and, for most people, dispositive. One may view 
a specific excommunication as unjust, as with the stripping of citizenship from 
a dissident, but it is hard to argue that established institutional authorities are 
legally inefficacious whenever they behave unjustly. It was, for example, 
difficult to proclaim that Mstislav Rostropovich, the great Russian cellist, 
continued to be a Soviet citizen (as distinguished from a “Russian”) when the 
then-existing Soviet state in effect expelled him from the community in 
1978.174 
Protestant churches obviously have more difficulty in this regard; 
boundaries are far more permeable, and that is even more true with regard, say, 
to what we sometimes refer to as racial or ethnic “communities.” Dismissive 
terms like “oreo” or “banana” are used to denigrate the authenticity of 
identities and thus the legitimacy of membership in the community for whom 
the person using such terms claims to speak.175 Missourians might be 
especially familiar with the term “RINO” (Republican in Name Only) 
inasmuch as that has apparently been applied to former Republican Senator 
John Danforth by his more “purist” conservative Republican critics.176 Recall 
Jason Frank’s comment that deciding who belongs to a given people “is not a 
question the people can procedurally decide because the very question subverts 
 
 172. Id. See also id. at 47. 
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the premises of its resolution.”177 The very asking of the question can create 
intellectual vertigo or what Wittgenstein notably called “mental cramps.”178 
Perhaps a good example of such a “cramped” consciousness is provided by one 
Elisha Potter, Jr., a militant opponent of Thomas Dorr’s Suffrage Association 
and its capacious conception of who comprised “the people” of that state. After 
beginning by noting the obvious absurdity that according to the tenets of the 
Association the people—or, more accurately, those persons actually regarded 
as having some say within a community and therefore truly “counting”—might 
“include[] women as well as men,” as well as “persons under twenty one 
years,” he goes on to the crux of the matter: Once one “refuse[s] to recognize 
the authority of the freeholders and those who now constitute the legal voters 
and undertake to define for yourselves who the people are, there is no knowing 
where to stop and no possibility of agreeing upon any other limitation.”179 At 
some level, Potter is right: How does one decide “where to stop” and what 
“limitation[s]” will distinguish logically possible from actually communally 
acceptable definitions unless one relies on some existing institutions, in that 
case the body of participants authorized to participate in the polity existing in 
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations by the Crown in 1663? Note well that 
they had the authority to amend the Charter; there was no suggestion that a 
court should decide the merits of the issue. The point, though, is that unless 
and until those authorized to act in fact took relevant action, the answer to the 
question “who counts” was settled, at least in the absence of “reformation” or 
“revolution.” 
Among other things, this means that we should look well beyond courts or 
highly institutional religions with regard to determining “who counts.” Just as 
examples of the problem appear ubiquitous once one starts thinking about it, so 
this is true of institutions that claim to assuage our confusion by providing 
firm, definitive answers. Sometimes the institutions will be explicitly “legal” 
ones. Other times they will be more “ordinary” institutions that, nonetheless, 
must make decisions as to “who counts” in their everyday operations. 
Consider, for example, the decision by the Conservative Jewish synagogue 
Temple Beth Hillel-Beth El, outside of Philadelphia, to adopt a policy of 
accepting as “household” members religiously intermarried couples.180 Each 
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member of such households is entitled to vote on synagogue issues, including, 
presumably, whom to hire as a rabbi or what traditional rituals should be 
adhered to or modified, which means that non-Jews will have the right to cast a 
vote. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this policy runs counter to that of the United 
Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, the umbrella group for Conservative 
congregations in America, which represents the movement’s congregations and 
opposes membership rights for non-Jews.181 Even in the case of Temple Hillel-
Beth El, though, membership rights will apparently not include the right to 
serve in positions of leadership. Reform Judaism has been more latitudinarian, 
beginning, of course, with the rejection of exclusive reliance on matrilineal 
descent.182 Given the fact that most intermarried couples who affiliate with 
Jewish institutions are likely to do so with Reform temples, the issue of joint 
membership has become almost routine. And, in a 2007 essay, Rabbi Kerry 
Olitzky, the head of the Jewish Outreach Institute, explicitly defended the 
importance of including a vote along with more abstract membership: 
If we consider the history of the United States, what really delivers citizenship 
status to people is voting rights. The Jewish community is not the same as a 
democratic state, yet that is what gives us more flexibility to make changes. 
Consider women’s suffrage or the civil rights movement. At their core were 
voting rights. And it wasn’t until women or African American citizens were 
given the right to vote that real equality became a possibility for either group. 
It is the same with those who come from other faith communities and live in 
our midst. Until we offer them full voting rights in our institutions, no matter 
what we do, they will still be considered—and feel like—second-class 
citizens….183 
It is hard to better Rabbi Olitzky’s argument that “being counted” makes one 
feel that “one counts” in the full dignitary sense. But, I presume, many readers 
will still share a sense of perplexity at how one defines a “Jewish” (or, for that 
matter, any other) community. 
So take what is perhaps the most fundamental example of institutional 
“counting,” which is establishing an accurate—or at least popularly accepted 
and thus legitimate—number of people living within the United States. After 
all, the Constitution requires the national government to “enumerate” the 
population of the United States every ten years,184 and we have established a 
Census Bureau to carry out the prescribed task. So to find the answer to the 
question “who counts” as a member of the American community, one 
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presumably turns to the Census Bureau, which tabulated the total number of 
persons resident within the United States on April 1, 2010 as 308,745,538.185 
These presumptively comprise the 2010 “We the People” who are part of a 
common enterprise. Again, it is important to note that one should be dubious 
about the sanctity of the specific number; indeed, there are many important 
controversies, both technical and political, about “undercounts,” especially of 
certain minorities or the homeless. Even more to the point, are earlier-
mentioned controversies about what some might describe as an “overcount” 
simply by virtue of simultaneously counting illegal immigrants at all and 
concomitantly denying their membership in “We the People” by actively trying 
to deport millions of them.186 Still, the Census Bureau does provide us a count, 
ideally, of every human being within the geographical territory of the United 
States on April 1, and nothing more than that completely contingent fact is 
suggested by being lumped together. In any case, no one has (yet) suggested 
that we simply ignore those figures as tainted and accept some others as legally 
authoritative. 
Although the most important single task of the Census Bureau is to 
compute a single set of final numbers establishing the populations of the nation 
at large and then the constituent sub-polities, both state and local, it also plays 
a crucial role in computing as well the numbers of group members within all of 
these polities. As David Kertzer and Dominique Arel put it in introducing a 
fascinating collection of essays on census-taking around the world, “The 
census . . . emerged as the most visible, and arguably the most politically 
important, means by which states statistically depict collective identities.”187 
Thus one can find a helpful map, constructed by the U.S. Census, indicating 
the percentage of Hispanics by state after the 2000 census.188 The only 
problem—should one say “of course”—is that deciding who is Hispanic or any 
of the other myriad of racial and ethnic categories used in American discourse 
and, just as importantly, American public policy, generates the most severe 
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cases of mental cramps.189 This is, after all, the point of Justice Stevens’s 
anguished dissent in Fullilove.190 And, Professor—and former Census 
Director—Prewitt is often scathing with regard to the “incoherent” categories 
that we use when determining race and ethnicity within the United States.191 
Moreover, the questions asked in any given census, including the 
opportunity set of possible definitions, do “much more than simply reflect 
social reality.”192 Instead, they play “a key role in the construction of that 
reality.”193 Kertzer and Arel well describe “the census [as] a cauldron of racial 
construction.”194 Although learned debates are—and, historically always have 
been—held about the “science” of racial and ethnic identity, it should be 
obvious that such efforts, if not entirely bogus, are inevitably doomed to failure 
precisely because real political stakes are often attached to what the numbers 
are purported to demonstrate. Moreover, and perhaps more ominously, the 
introduction of various classifications by census bureaus has often worked to 
create social divisions where previously they were dampened, if not absent. 
People who previously imagined themselves as “part of the complex web of 
relationships, practices, and beliefs they shared now became something quite 
different. An identifiable, distinct culture was distinguished,” allowing people 
not only to band together, but also (inevitably?) to begin viewing others as 
Others.195 
James Scott has noted the importance of census-taking to colonial 
administrators, who have their own interest in strategies of dividing and 
conquering. What he terms the “artificial inventions” of census takers “can end 
by becoming categories that organize people’s daily experiences precisely 
because they are embedded in state-created institutions that structure that 
experience.”196 Thus, a sufficiently powerful state can use categories 
instantiated in census-taking “not merely [as] means to make their environment 
legible; they are an authoritative tune to which most of the population must 
dance.” 197 
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It is unsurprising that it is no small matter for a country to be able to 
conduct a popularly accepted census. Thus an article about the near-
impossibility of conducting a census in contemporary Pakistan notes the 
myriad difficulties, including violence, that stand in the way.198 There has been 
no national census since 1998.199 The year 2011 was supposed to be the 
“Population Year,” but it did not turn out that way, not least because of the 
opposition of “major parties [that] draw their power from rural 
constituencies.”200 Were a new census to highlight “the extent of the country’s 
urbanization, a census would lead to the creation of new urban 
constituencies.”201 Another ethnically divided country, Lebanon, “did not have 
a census for more than three decades after independence for fear the results 
would reveal certain demographic changes that would undermine the existing 
system created to balance different religious interests.”202 The “demographic 
changes” referred to are not anything so banal as former farmers who have 
moved to the cities, but rather, the actual numbers (and percentages) of 
Muslims and Maronite Christians, who had agreed to a power-sharing 
agreement in the 1943 constitution.203 The notion of “balance” is surely not 
based on a “one-group/one-vote” principle, but rather, dividing up the offices 
by reference to the actual membership of the groups in question. 
But even states that can, more-or-less successfully, conduct censuses run 
into problems of determining how to identify specific groups. Thus Melissa 
Nobles, in a valuable article on “[r]acial categorization and censuses,” includes 
useful discussions and appendices on the remarkable array of different terms 
and categories that census takers were expected to apply in the United States 
and Brazil.204 The year 1880 required census takers in the U.S. to distinguish 
among those residents who were “White; Black; Mulatto; Chinese; [and] 
Indian.”205 Ten years later the categories were “White; Black; Mulatto; 
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Quadroon; Octoroon; Chinese; Japanese; Indian.”206 By 1930, “quadroons” 
and “octoroons” were dropped from the list, but “Filipino; Hindu; Korean,” 
plus the opportunity to “write in” a different, presumably individually-chosen 
identity, had been added.207 
One way of escaping some of the dilemmas attached to requiring hapless 
census takers to discern the specific identities of individuals is to allow what 
has come to be called “self-identification.” For example, “I am a Jew, an 
Hispanic, a male, a ___ because that is what I say I am, and who are you to tell 
me that I am not?” This is the ultimate response to “sez who?”—“Sez me! (or, 
for the linguistically fastidious, “Sez I!”). This may be a particularly attractive 
option to those with an individualist or libertarian bent. Thus Randall Kennedy 
wrote in 2003: 
A well-ordered multiracial society ought to allow its members free entry into 
and exit from racial categories, even if the choices they make clash with 
traditional understandings of who is “black” and who is “white,” and even if, 
despite making such choices in good faith, individuals mislead observers who 
rely on conventional racial signaling.208 
The words “good faith” may be crucial. Thus Kennedy devotes roughly four 
pages to the saga of Paul and Phillip Malone, two Boston firemen who claimed 
their right to participate in an affirmative action program on the grounds, true 
or not, that they had discovered that their “maternal great-grandmother” was 
black (whatever exactly that means).209 Should Boston be allowed to police 
these racial borders, so to speak, or is it sufficient that the Malones had rather 
suddenly discovered their African-American heritage in circumstances where 
that provided them a potential boon? 
And consider the fact that “the number of Americans of Slovak, Croat, and 
French Canadian ancestry more than doubled between the 1980 and 1990 
censuses, while the number of Cajuns increased sixty-fold—all four categories 
which were not listed in 1980, but were in 1990.”210 Such a list served as an 
invitation either to create or acknowledge previously repressed identities. A 
key issue in contemporary “census politics” involves the demand that people 
be allowed to identify themselves as “multiracial,” neither X nor Y, at least if 
these are thought to be mutually exclusive identities, but rather both. Such an 
option has been vigorously fought by African-American organizations that, 
probably rightly, see the acceptance of such a category as working contrary to 
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their political or economic interests. No doubt they were relieved when 
President Obama apparently chose “African-American” as his identity in the 
2010 census instead of “biracial,” as the son of a white mother.211 Or consider 
whether the 2020 census will include “transgender” or some other similar 
category as an option. A society devoted to ensuring the “blessings of liberty” 
might well find attractive the notion that those of us who make up “We the 
People” should be given carte blanche in announcing what kind of people we 
are. Yet it is telling that only the most utopian would suggest adopting this 
kind of libertarian latitudinarianism with regard to the most basic question of 
the census: “[A]re you a citizen or non-citizen of the United States?” For the 
answer to that question, we continue to look to authoritative institutions, 
though not the Census, to supply the one correct answer. 
It should not be surprising, then, that debates over “disenrollment” within 
American Indian tribes include not only abstract discussions about the nature 
of identity, but also specific references to who has the authority to issue a 
conclusive answer. “Who counts?” turns into the question, “Sez who?” 
Consider the debate over who is a member of the Nooksack Tribe. In May 
2013, Nooksack Tribal Chief Judge Raquel Montoya-Lewis held that those 
protesting their disenrollment had no legal right to injunctive relief.212 She 
emphasized the broad discretion granted the tribal council with regard to 
decisions about tribal membership.213 Thus the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
protected the sued tribal officials unless their actions “exceed . . . official 
duties in a manner that verges on bad faith, not simply by making technical 
errors of law.”214 Part of the controversy involves how to determine whether a 
given person meets the criteria of having “one-fourth Indian blood and any 
degree of Nooksack tribal ancestry.”215 Tribal officials are apparently 
supporting a proposed amendment that would strike the relevant clause from 
the tribal constitution.216 Tribal member Bernita Madera is described as “one 
of many who support” the “efforts to remove people who never should have 
been granted tribal membership in the first place.”217 The spirit of Elijah 
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Potter, and his anxieties about the implications of accepting radical notions 
associated with the Suffrage Association,218 live on. 
One can only wonder if the litigation will ultimately make its way into the 
federal judiciary, perhaps even the Supreme Court, and lead to further 
consideration of the implications of its famous 1978 decision in Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez.219 In that case, one of the few “Indian rights cases” to inch 
into the canon of general constitutional law by virtue of its testing what we 
mean by “Equal Protection of the Law,” the Court in effect upheld the 
Pueblo’s right to deny membership to children of a woman who married 
outside the Pueblo even though children of men who married exogenously 
could transfer such membership.220 The Court, through Justice Marshall, 
emphasized that “[a] tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal 
purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent 
political community.”221 To be sure, under American law, the tribe’s “right” is 
not protected against being overridden by congressional statute.222 At best, 
Indian tribes are only “semi-sovereign” nations, not truly comparable, say, to 
the United States or any other “sovereign nation” that, at least as a matter of 
law, answers to no higher authority when deciding “who counts.” But, in the 
absence of such a statute, the Pueblo does have authority. 
If one acknowledges such authority in the United States, the Catholic 
Church, a group of rabbis in Israel, or the United Synagogue of Conservative 
Congregations—all of which are fully capable of making undoubtedly unjust 
decisions—then the obvious question is why we would grant American Indian 
tribes less authority to violate our own sense of propriety in essentially 
contested matters. How and why does it become our business to say who is a 
Nooksack, a Catholic, or a Jew, or even an American, unless, of course, we 
claim some individual linkage to the community in question? And, in 
particular, what business is it of ours to deny institutional authority, which in 
some cases may trace back centuries or even millennia, as a means of resolving 
what otherwise would be truly insoluble questions? Those of us who are 
Jewish may have a personal reason to get involved in debates about “who 
counts” as a Jew or who should be allowed membership (and a vote) within a 
congregation, just as Catholics may similarly feel personally affected by 
whether local bishops will deny them communion or even threaten 
excommunication for failure to adhere to what the bishop (or, perhaps, even 
the Pope) believes is an essential tenet of the faith. But why, precisely, should I 
care, or, even more to the point, claim any rights to intervene, if a public figure 
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is denied communion because of his insufficient militance on preventing 
abortions? Thus Raymond Burke, the former Catholic archbishop of St. Louis, 
announced that he would deny communion to both John Kerry and Rudolph 
Giuliani.223 I certainly have views about this, but should I claim any right to 
call upon the state to intervene in lieu of recognizing the institutional 
autonomy of the Catholic Church operating through its designated authorities? 
This is most definitely not to say that we should casually defer to 
institutional authority, even if its lineage goes a long way back. Brown v. 
Board of Education, after all, was surely correct in its basic insight that 
segregation humiliated African-Americans by telling them that they had to 
remain separated from those who were truly full members of the 
community.224 One can similarly endorse Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement 
test” in the area of Establishment of Religion, whatever its difficulty of 
application, by virtue of its recognition that the impact of apparent state 
endorsement of a particular sectarian view is to lessen the belief on the part of 
those outside the relevant community that they indeed fully count.225 
Federalism is, after all, a particular theory of state autonomy in determining 
“who counts” as members of given communities and in what ways, and one of 
the overriding lessons particularly of post-World War II American 
constitutionalism is the importance of limiting such autonomy in the name of 
“national” (or, for some, even more transcendent) values.226 But, for better or 
often for worse, we do not—and probably should not—expect all non-state 
institutions to feel bound to those values. 
VIII.  ON INSTITUTIONAL MISTRUST 
Were I to stop here, one might well be tempted to see this talk as moving 
toward some kind of at least limited “happy ending,” even if it recognizes that 
particular individuals may well be unhappy at the identities assigned to them 
by institutional counters. Alas, I do not think that things are, relatively 
speaking, so simple. Begin only by asking why we generally shift, with some 
exceptions, from self-identification to institutional identification. The answer, 
quite obviously, is that we are faced with a set of essentially contested 
questions that, by definition, produce quite different answers. The response is 
to recognize the wisdom of Thomas Hobbes, that most scary of all English-
speaking political philosophers, who recognized that perhaps the most basic 
task of the sovereign is to provide a set of unchallengeable definitions to what 
otherwise would remain questions generating not only intellectual contestation, 
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but also, as he fully experienced, civil war.227 There is more than a trace of 
Hobbes in Justice Scalia, who fears the potential for anarchy in the absence of 
the ability to rely on authoritative language.228 
But note that Justice Scalia has also been one of the most consistent critics, 
over his now almost three decades on the Court, of claims to judicial authority 
itself. He has written acidly about any notion of a “living Constitution” that by 
definition relies on the wisdom of judges in effect to “update” the meanings of 
what Robert Jackson once notably referred to as the “majestic generalities” of 
the Constitution, though he elsewhere also referred, perhaps less 
inspirationally, to the “cryptic words of the Fourteenth Amendment.”229 I have 
recently suggested that one can profitably distinguish two quite different 
aspects of the United States Constitution: one that I call the Constitution of 
Settlement, the other the Constitution of Conversation.230 To simplify 
somewhat, the first refers to the hard-wired institutional features of the 
Constitution—think only of the fact that we have two Houses of Congress, 
with members serving different terms of office and, in the Senate, each state 
having an equal number of votes.231 Among other things, these aspects of the 
Constitution, which I have come to believe are in fact the document’s most 
important clauses, are never litigated because there is really nothing to argue 
about in terms of what they “mean” or how they should be “interpreted.” 
Instead, what comprises the docket, so to speak, of both professors and 
judges is the Constitution of Conversation, those parts of the document that are 
in fact litigated, perhaps endlessly, and present myriad challenges of 
“meaning” and “interpretation.”232 Not surprisingly, the Constitution of 
Conversation, perhaps by definition, involves those parts of the Constitution 
that themselves can be described as “essentially contested concepts,” such as 
“Equal Protection of the Laws” or “Free Exercise of Religion,” both of which, 
also unsurprisingly, inevitably raise questions about “who counts.” So why not 
count on judges, say, to supply definitive answers, a la the Hobbesian 
sovereign? Indeed, as noted earlier, the Court has on several occasions over the 
past half-century claimed just such a role. Though he has taken part and joined 
some opinions that can be described as offering a “juricentric” view of the 
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Constitution,233 Justice Scalia is probably more well known for his attacks on 
the willingness of his colleagues to offer what he regards as merely their own 
personal views as the “meaning” of the law. In some cases, Scalia would defer 
almost completely to decisions of the legislature, especially, it appears, state 
legislatures.234 (About Congress, he demonstrates far more concern.235) In his 
“deferential” phase, though, he exhibits reticence about substituting his views 
for those of another, presumably more authoritative, institution. When he does 
assert judicial authority, he is apt to take refuge in arguments drawn from 
purported “plain meaning” of the text236 or ostensibly clear historically derived 
interpretations.237 But he always remains, at least rhetorically, the justice who 
once denounced the reality of judicial “balancing” as basically horrific.238 
What Justice Scalia instantiates, and I do not necessarily mean this to be 
critical, is the ever-diminishing basic trust in the United States in established 
institutions, one of whose central functions is to authoritatively determine 
“who counts” (in what circumstances and with what weight) and other 
freighted questions central to our political system. After all, as suggested 
above, the Court’s systematic critique of state claims to autonomy rested not 
only on abstract theories of the Constitution, but also, and perhaps far more 
importantly, on the perception that one could simply not trust those who 
controlled state government to give adequate weight—to count fairly—the 
interests of their entire citizenry, let alone their non-citizen population. For 
many the most important moment of dis-establishing state autonomy was Roe 
v. Wade,239 invalidating the existing laws concerning abortion in all fifty of the 
states. Yet the country has scarcely accepted the Court as the “last word” on 
when protectable “life” begins, whatever the hopes expressed in the plurality 
opinion by Justices Souter, Kennedy, and O’Connor in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.240 In that sense—and many opponents of 
Roe would say other senses as well—there is a comparison to Dred Scott, the 
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authority of which as “law of the land” was vigorously rejected by Abraham 
Lincoln (much to the consternation of Senator Stephen Douglas).241 It took a 
war, and 750,000 deaths, to determine, as a constitutional matter, “who counts” 
as a member of the American and state political communities.242 
The Court’s own “juricentrism,” expressed across a wide swath of issues, 
scarcely seems to have prevailed among the public at large, as perhaps 
revealed in a July 2013 Gallup poll243 determining that more Americans (46%) 
“disapprove” of the way that the Supreme Court “is handling its job” than 
approve (43%). Even if this difference is well within the famous margin of 
error, and even if “disapproval” is accompanied with what political scientists 
call sufficient “diffuse support” to lead even critics to mutter that, nonetheless, 
when the Supreme Court speaks, the rest of us must listen and obey,244 this 
cannot be good news for devotees of the Supreme Court. What would be truly 
interesting is knowing what Justices Scalia and Ginsburg might have told the 
pollster, given their own well-publicized criticisms of the Court and, therefore, 
of their colleagues.245 
Deference to the Court scarcely seems to have been replaced by affection 
and esteem for the other two branches of the national government. For October 
2013, a summary of polls reveals that approximately 8% of Americans 
“approve” of the Congress, while almost 83% “disapprove.”246 The President’s 
ratings, depending on any given poll, are certainly better than his congressional 
counterparts,247 but are not better than those of the Court. Only the American 
military retains the confidence of most of the American public,248 a fact (or 
factoid) that might provoke justified ambivalence. One might refer as well to 
the other institutions mentioned in my talk today and suggest that they, too, are 
suffering from their own crises of authority. The Catholic Church faces threats 
not only from traditional Protestant rivals, but also from dissidents within the 
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Church, even if it retains the ultimate ability to excommunicate those who 
cross certain “red lines.” Just as President Obama proved less than fully 
resolute with regard to his own “red line” involving the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria, however, so it remains to be seen if Pope Francis, who 
seems to be striving to set a new tone for the Papacy following the more 
militant Pope Benedict XVI, will be so quick to count dissidents out of the 
Church. One can wonder if contemporary councils within and among the many 
recognized tribes within the United States will easily be able to maintain their 
authority over the would-be members of those tribes. The United States 
certainly retains formal authority to decide who is, and who is not, a citizen, 
but it is crystal clear that it does not have sufficient authority—or perhaps even 
raw power—to expel those who “don’t count” as official members of the 
American community even to the extent that resident aliens most certainly do. 
(Perhaps it would be as if excommunicated Catholics insisted on attending 
services and taking communion.) Nor can one confidently predict the future 
with regard to addressing the complexities of how we decide who qualifies for 
“affirmative action” and who, on the contrary, can be legitimately excluded. 
In any event, I hope I have adequately demonstrated that the question “who 
counts”—inevitably accompanied by the “sez who” questions: “who does the 
counting on the basis of what authority?”—is central not only to academic 
political theorists, but also, and probably more importantly, to anyone 
concerned with the actualities of American—or any other—politics and, 
finally, to persons particularly interested in the role of law and legal 
institutions in providing authoritative answers. Our futures as a political 
community may depend on finding widely shared answers to both. 
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